German Studies Association

Newsletter

Volume XXXII Number 2 Winter 2007–08 German Studies Association Main Office: 1200 Academy Street Kalamazoo, MI 49006-3295 USA Tel.: (269) 337-7364 Fax: (269) 337-7251 www.thegsa.org e-mail: director@thegsa.org Technical Support: techsupport@thegsa.org

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German Studies Association

Newsletter

Volume XXXII Number 2 Winter 2007–08

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Letter from the Executive Director

Dear Members and Friends of the GSA,

The thirty-first annual conference of the GSA was the largest in our association's history. Almost a thousand participants—968, to be exact, including 185 from outside North America—took part in the conference from 4 to 7 October 2007 at the Town and Country Resort in San Diego, California. We also had a record number of sessions (285) and record levels of participation at our luncheons and banquet.

The preparations for this conference were thus especially complex, and it simply could not have taken place without the efforts of the 2007 Program Committee. The entire GSA owes the Committee a huge debt of gratitude, with special thanks and kudos extended to our indefatigable Program Director for 2007, Professor Andrew Lees of the Department of History at Rutgers University, Camden Campus. Andy not only managed a record number of submissions, he also spent many weeks working very closely with our webmaster, Terry Pochert, and me to streamline and improve the online submission process for 2008. We hope that you will be pleased with the results, and we invite your comments and suggestions. (Conference proposals for 2008 can be submitted on the Web site after 5 January 2008, while online membership renewals can be submitted at any time.) The other members of our outstanding 2007 Program Committee were Professors Katherine Aaslestad (West Virginia University), Katharina Gerstenberger (University of Cincinnati), Gunther M. Hega (Western Michigan University), Young-Sun Hong (State University of New York, Stony Brook), and Benjamin Marschke (Humboldt State University).

We also appreciated the hospitality and efficiency of the Town and Country staff and of the entire San Diego community. As we all know, only days after our conference had ended, San Diego County had to deal with destructive fires that destroyed hundreds of homes and devastated thousands of acres. Happily, the Town and Country staff dealt successfully with the disaster, and the complex itself was not damaged. We extend our best wishes to the people of San Diego, and I am assured that tourist and convention activities there are quickly returning to normal.

Our next conference will take place in early October 2008 at the Crowne Plaza Hotel–St. Paul Riverfront in St. Paul, Minnesota. Please see this newsletter and our Web site (www.thegsa.org) for further details. As already noted, we have substantially revised and simplified the online submission process, and welcome your comments and suggestions.

In her letter in this issue, President Sara Lennox will inform you about some of the major decisions that were taken at the annual meeting of the GSA Executive Committee (soon to be renamed the GSA Board) in San Diego. Most importantly, you will all be informed in the very near future about a set of proposed revisions to our bylaws, and members of course will have an opportunity to vote on them.

This issue contains reports on GSA and related business and also continues our recent practice of including self-descriptions of affiliated or related associations and organizations, in this case the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS) and the International Association for the Study of German Politics

(IASGP). In addition, we are continuing our series on "Themes and Discussions in German Studies," this time with the text of a speech that I presented in Edinburgh last May and the texts of two addresses—by Charlie Jeffery and Peter Gay—presented at our San Diego conference.

Finally, it also gives us a great deal of pleasure to include, in this issue, a description of a remarkable gift to Wartburg College from our founding Executive Director, Professor Gerald R. Kleinfeld.

Best regards,

David

David E. Barclay Executive Director

Letter from the President

Dear Colleagues,

These are exciting times for the GSA! As most of you know, at the beginning of October the GSA convened a marvelous conference in sunny San Diego, with the largest number of panels and largest number of attendees ever. Members were entirely charmed by Yoko Tawada's reading, "Sprachpolizei und Spielpolyglotte" at our Friday luncheon. Though we greatly regretted that an accident prevented Peter Gay from traveling to San Diego and presenting his Friday evening banquet address "Why?" in person, the talk was spiritedly delivered by Helmut Walser Smith. (Once again we send Peter Gay our best wishes for a speedy recovery.) We were particularly thrilled that Charlie Jeffery could present the Saturday luncheon address "Germany and Europe: A Shifting Vocation?" in the context of the founding of the new International Association of the Study of German Politics, of which he is chair. I myself heard only very positive responses from our conference-goers, and now conference reports on the panels are beginning to appear on H-German that reveal the many dazzling varieties of innovative scholarly work presented at the conference. We are again pleased that as a consequence of an initiative that began last year, many more panels on earlier periods of German history were organized, and they were supplemented by "A Virtual Tour of the 2006 Magdeburg Exhibition on the Holy Roman Empire," presented on Saturday evening by its curator Alexander Schubert. We owe an enormous debt of gratitude to our imaginative and hard-working Program Committee, directed by Andrew Lees, ably assisted by Ben Marschke (medieval, early modern, and eighteenth century), Katherine Aaslestad (nineteenth century), Katharina Gerstenberger (twentieth/twenty-first century literature and cultural studies), Young Sun Hong (twentieth/twentieth-first century history), and Gunther Hega (political science).

The single question I heard posed by GSA members about the conference was: "How big is *too* big?" I have been pondering that question a lot since the conference. It is true that, for the first time in the many years since I have been attending GSA conferences, it was impossible for me to gain an impression of the conference as a whole. Since so many different topics, areas, historical periods, and disciplines were represented in the many panels, it was possible only for conference-goers to follow one or a few "threads" of their particular interest, and I suppose it is something of a loss that there can no longer be anything like one common conference experience for all GSA members present. On the other hand, at least from the perspective of my own discipline, German cultural studies, which at many academic institutions has found itself under siege because of dropping student enrollments and assaults on the humanities in general, it is very much in our interest to be able to point to the GSA conference, thronged with attendees and burgeoning with new ideas, as evidence of the growing vitality of our field. So from my perspective, at least, an ever-expanding GSA conference with increasing participation from all disciplines and generations within German Studies can only be viewed as positive.

Of course many other things happen at the GSA besides an abundance of schol-

arly panels. Much networking takes place, many new plans are forged, and both newcomers and those of us who have been around for a while find the opportunity to meet with old friends and make new ones one of the most pleasant aspects of the GSA. We are enormously pleased to welcome large numbers of younger scholars to the GSA conference and to acknowledge that (from the perspective of us oldtimers) the Nachwuchs is a growing presence within the GSA. In that context, with the support of the GSA leadership, two important new interest groups with great promise for further GSA involvement were organized at the 2007 GSA conference, about which you can read elsewhere in this newsletter: a Junior Faculty Caucus and a Graduate Student Caucus. If you belong to one of those groups, we encourage you to contact the conveners of the groups and to contribute to the activities they are proposing. On the model of the now over-thirty-year-old organization Women in German, we hope the new interdisciplinary caucuses can offer advice and support to specific groups across academic disciplines within German Studies and can also help the GSA as an organization to identify and better address their particular needs.

On the Thursday before each GSA conference begins, the annual meeting of the GSA Executive Committee, the Association's policy-setting body, takes place. At its lively 2007 meeting, the Executive Committee was able to come to agreement on many matters that should allow our organization to function even better. We were enormously pleased that GSA webmaster Terry Pochert was able to join the Executive Committee meeting to discuss new procedures for online submission and other ways we can make the GSA Web site more useful and appealing to members (see also David Barclay's letter to members in this newsletter). Another important item of business was a discussion of the revision of the current GSA Bylaws (posted on the GSA Web site at https://thegsa.org/about/bylaws.asp) to clarify language that was unclear, fill in critical gaps, bring the Bylaws into conformity with existing GSA practice, and amend some provisions that were clearly unworkable. A Task Force composed of Gary Cohen (chair), Carol Anne Costabile-Heming, and Patricia Herminghouse worked through the spring and summer to produce a thoughtful new draft of the bylaws, which were then debated and further amended during the Executive Board meeting. Important revisions include changing the name of the GSA Executive Committee to GSA Board; adding a member to the current eight-person board so that three new members are elected each year, mandating that one Board member always represent Austrian or German Swiss studies, changing the secretarytreasurer from an elected to an appointed officer, and proposing review procedures for the executive director and the secretary-treasurer. The revised Bylaws will be posted on the GSA Web site later in the year and, as the Bylaws provide, the GSA membership will be asked to vote on the new provisions in coming months.

The GSA Executive Board also voted to approve the launching of several new GSA initiatives. We are beginning a cooperation with the American Association of the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS) that may involve joint panels at each other's conferences or other common projects. Barbara Kosta is the Executive Board member who will be coordinating these joint efforts. The GSA has long suffered from the lack of a logo to "brand" our association, and Carol Anne

Costabile-Heming agreed to chair a Subcommittee that will work to develop one, assisted by Subcommittee members Celia Applegate and Marion Deshmukh, with our webmaster Terry Pochert serving as an ex officio member. The Executive Committee has also decided to award two new prizes. One award will be given annually to a graduate student for the best paper of any subject related to German Studies, with that paper to be published in *German Studies Review*, procedures drafted by Stephen Brockmann (chair), April Eisman, and Suzanne Marchand. The second prize, sponsored by the Stiftung für Deutsch-Amerikanische Wissenschaftsbeziehungen, will be given to a young social scientist for the best paper presented at a GSA conference, with a prize of 1000 euro and publication in *German Politics & Society*. Procedures for that prize were drafted by Joyce Mushaben (chair), Alice Cooper, and Dan Hough. As soon as prize procedures are finalized, information on how to apply or nominate candidates for the prize will be widely publicized.

Other new GSA projects need further discussion, and the Executive Committee instructed the Executive Council (the elected and appointed officers) to confer further on these issues at their annual retreat in December and to report the results of their deliberations back to the Executive Committee. Since the spring, a Task Force on Interdisciplinary Initiatives comprised Katherine Roper (chair), Gerald Fetz, Barbara Kosta, and Helmut Walser Smith has been discussing how to institutionalize interdisciplinary approaches and collaboration more firmly within our association. That is an enormously complex project on which the Executive Council will confer thoroughly in December. As well, the Executive Council will discuss whether we can further encourage member collaboration within and across fields by establishing forums focused on particular topics that will be located on the GSA Web site, and, if so, how such forums would be organized and maintained.

Finally, we are very happy to report that, as a service to our members, beginning with the Spring 2008 issue, the *GSA Newsletter* will annually publish a listing of dissertations completed in all areas of German Studies. We are very grateful that GSA Vice President Celia Applegate has agreed to take on the task of assembling that listing.

As this accounting perhaps reveals, serving as GSA President is a strenuous activity! But it is also hugely rewarding to work together with Executive Director David Barclay and other officers, as congenial a bunch as could be imagined and now close friends as well as colleagues, for the good of our association and of interdisciplinary German Studies. I thank all GSA members for your many contributions to the accomplishments of the GSA and wish for us all that 2008 be as exciting and productive a year for all areas of German Studies as 2007 has been.

We invite all members to send us their opinions about any of these matters so that we can include your ideas in our discussions.

Sara Lennox President, GSA

Reports and Announcements

2007 DAAD/GSA Prize Winners Announced

The Deutsche Akademische Austauschdienst and the German Studies Association are pleased to announce this year's prize recipients, who were recognized at the GSA's thirty-first annual banquet in San Diego on October 5.

The 2007 GSA/DAAD prize for the best book of the last two years in the fields of history or political science was awarded to Professor Celia Applegate (University of Rochester) for her book *Bach in Berlin: Nation and Culture in Mendelssohn's Revival of the St. Matthew's Passion* (Cornell University Press). The Prize Committee members were Professors A. James McAdams, chair (University of Notre Dame); Shelley Baranowski, (University of Akron); and James Brophy (University of Delaware). In announcing its decision, the committee had this to say about Professor Applegate's book:

Celia Applegate richly deserves our praise. In her new book, *Bach in Berlin: Nation and Culture in Mendelssohn's Revival of the St. Matthew Passion*, she provides an original and thought-provoking perspective on the cultural and social roots of Mendelssohn's hugely successful performance at the Berlin Singakademie in 1829 of Bach's long-forgotten masterpiece. Applegate argues that the "revival" of the *Passion* not only marked the culmination of cultural and social developments from the Enlightenment to the end of the Romantic period. It exemplified an historical transition under which the German *Bildungsbürgertum* was led to associate music, and especially Bach, with "Germanness."

In six thoroughly researched chapters, Applegate introduces the reader to a host of topics: the leading social and cultural elites of the time, including such assimilated Jewish families as the Mendelssohns, in whose salons Bach's reputation was first revived; public debates over aesthetics in newly minted journals and newspapers, with which musicians and critics overturned longstanding biases about music as an art form and established new standards of taste and judgment; the novelty of the public concert, an early manifestation of civil society that signaled the decline of court culture and provided fresh opportunities for amateur musicians to pursue cultural activities; and, finally, changes in religious expression, particularly evident among educated Protestants, that gave rise to the secular national culture of nineteenth-century Germany.

Applegate's argument is always subtle and nuanced. Although she concludes that Bach's revival among *Bildungsbürger* forged longstanding connections between German national identity and Protestantism, she avoids facile generalizations about her subject matter. Mendelssohn's role in Bach's re-emergence, she convincingly maintains, suggested a confident and *cosmopolitan* sense of national identity, one that held the potential for embracing Germany's religious and cultural diversity. In making this case, Applegate challenges the reader to think deeply about such difficult concepts as *Bildung* and *Kulturnation*.

In sum, Applegate has written a notable book. Drawing on her longstand-

ing interest in German nationalism, she has shown how a "classical musical heritage" that crystallized in the 1820s led to enduring meanings for the cultured self and national identity. *Bach in Berlin* constitutes an innovative synthesis of musicology and national culture that opens up new conceptual space in the field of German history.

The article prize for 2007 was awarded for the best article in German literature or cultural studies that appeared in the *German Studies Review* in 2005–06. This year's recipient was Professor Derek Hillard (Kansas State University) for his May 2006 article "Rilke and Historical Discourse or the 'Histories' of *Malte Laurids Brigge*." The Prize Committee members were Professors Linda Schulte-Sasse, chair (Macalester College); Claudia Breger (Indiana University); and David Pan (Pennsylvania State University). The committee's citation stated:

The prize committee is pleased to award the GSA Article Prize to Derek Hillard for his essay "Rilke and Historical Discourse or the 'Histories' of *Malte Laurids Brigge*" in the May 2006 issue of *German Studies Review*. Hillard's essay illuminates a historiographical approach in Rilke's text that eschews linear narratives focusing on individuals or events, as well as other established models of historical writing. Rather, *Malte Laurids Brigge* produces a "chronicle-like" discourse that combines modes of historical writing with the novelistic to produce a new literary practice. It draws on premodern forms of historical discourse precisely to "articulate a self that is appropriate and respondent to the decentered terrain of urban modernity." The committee was unanimous in its appreciation at once of Hillard's nuanced reading of a literary text and of its potential for reflecting on forms of historical discourse, particularly for the modern urban subject. The essay is firmly grounded in critical theory, which informs but does not overwhelm Hillard's original reading. Finally, Hillard's lucid and at times powerful rhetoric renders the complexity of his argument accessible.

2007 Sybil Halpern Milton Book Prize Winner Announced

The German Studies Association is pleased to announce the 2007 winner of the Sybil Halpern Milton Book Prize for the best book in Holocaust Studies published in 2005–2006. This year's winner, announced at the annual banquet of the GSA, is Professor Samuel Moyn, Department of History, Columbia University, for his book *A Holocaust Controversy: The Treblinka Affair in Postwar France* (Brandeis University Press). The Prize Committee members were Professors Mark Roseman (chair, Indiana University), Claudia A. Koonz (Duke University), and Gerhard H. Weiss (University of Minnesota). In announcing its decision, the Prize Committee had this to say about Professor Moyn's book:

Samuel Moyn's *A Holocaust Controversy: The Treblinka Affair in Postwar France* is a work of sophistication, precision and nuance. As a book on Holocaust memory, it of course exists in a crowded field (and indeed found itself up

against an outstanding array of entrants for this year's Sybil Milton Prize). Yet it has much new to say, above all by opening up the trajectory of postwar French memory, revealing a part of the Holocaust's legacy often neglected in the English speaking world.

Moyn's topic is the controversy, now largely forgotten, aroused in 1966 by the appearance in France of Jean-Francois Steiner's book *Treblinka: The Revolt of an Extermination Camp*. It was this controversy, Moyn shows, and not Arendt on Eichmann, that was the seminal event in triggering or crystallizing a set of changes in the way in which the Holocaust was remembered and talked about in France, and to a certain extent even in the ways in which Jewish identity was constructed. What emerged was a new sense of the particularity of the Jewish experience under Nazi rule, and of the death camps' distinct task as against the "concentrationary universe." In its 200 something pages, Moyn's study manages to contextualize this discussion brilliantly both in wider French intellectual life and in inner-Jewish discussion.

Somehow Moyn casts a sympathetic light on all the protagonists in the debate, even Steiner himself, despite the latter's wanton misuse of survivor testimony and the sensationalism of his publicity campaign. Moyn renders the man intelligible, even though the full force of his critics, particularly of the witnesses whose testimony he had abused, is also heard. It is above all this pleasing and humane balance between empathy and critical detachment that makes *A Holocaust Controversy. The Treblinka Affair in Postwar France* a genuinely engaging, remarkable first book.

GSA Committee Appointments for 2008

Program Committee (St. Paul)

Chair: Patricia Herminghouse (University of Rochester)
Diachronic and Other: H. Glenn Penny (University of Iowa)
Medieval, Early Modern, 18th Century: Benjamin Marschke (Humboldt State University)
19th Century (all fields): Brent Peterson (Lawrence University)
20th- and 21st-Century History: Donna Harsch (Carnegie Mellon University)
20th- and 21st-Century Literature and Cultural Studies: Karin Bauer (McGill University)
Political Science: Charlie Jeffery (University of Edinburgh)

Nominating Committee, 2007:

(for VP in Germanics, Ex Comm in Pol Sci [1], Germanics [1], History [1]) Chair: Lynne Tatlock (Washington University), Germanics Maria Höhn (Vassar College), History Thomas Nolden (Wellesley College), Germanics Wade Jacoby (Brigham Young University), Political Science

Berlin Program for Advanced German and European Studies Selection Committee

Christopher Browning (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill), 2008–2010 (History)

David Conradt (East Carolina University), 2006–2008 (Political Science) Myra Marx Ferree (University of Wisconsin–Madison), 2007–2009 (Sociology) Beth Irwin Lewis (College of Wooster), 2007–2009 (Art History) Jean Quataert (Binghamton University), 2008–2010 (History) Frank Trommler (University of Pennsylvania), 2006–2008 (Germanics)

GSA Delegate to ACLS

Patricia Herminghouse (University of Rochester), 2007-2009

Archives Committee

Chair: Rainer Hering (Landesarchiv Schleswig-Holstein), 2006–2008 Rebecca Boehling (University of Maryland Baltimore County), 2007–2009 Sara Friedrichsmeyer (University of Cincinnati), 2007–2009 Norman Goda (Ohio University), 2006–2008 Gerhard Weinberg (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill), ongoing membership

GSA Representatives to Friends of the German Historical Institute

Celia Applegate (University of Rochester), 2008–2010 David E. Barclay (Kalamazoo College), 2008–2010

GSA/DAAD Book Prize 2008

(Books in literature/cultural studies from 2006–2007) Chair: Randall Halle (University of Pittsburgh) Nina Berman (The Ohio State University) John McCarthy (Vanderbilt University)

GSA/DAAD Article Prize 2008

(History/Social Sciences in *German Studies Review*, 2006–2007) Chair: Julia Sneeringer (Queen's College, CUNY) Susan Crane (University of Arizona) Thomas Lekan (University of South Carolina)

GSA Investment Committee

David E. Barclay, Chair Sara Lennox (statutory) Katherine Roper (statutory) Celia Applegate (statutory) Gerald A. Fetz (statutory) Two members to be appointed

Planning for the Next GSA Conference: St. Paul, October 2008

The 2008 conference of the GSA will take place October 2–5, 2008, at the Crowne Plaza Hotel St. Paul–Riverfront in downtown St. Paul, Minnesota, located directly on the banks of the Mississippi River, and with convenient access to the Minne-apolis/St.Paul International Airport.

As usual, the deadline for ALL submissions will be FEBRUARY 15, 2008. Submissions will be accepted online after 5 January 2008. Although the GSA encourages all types of submissions, including individual papers, members and non-member participants are urged, where practicable, to submit complete session proposals, including the names of proposed moderators and commentators.

Although the Program Committee will certainly not reject four-paper session proposals, submitters are reminded that four-paper sessions tend to inhibit commentary and discussion. On the whole, three-paper sessions are preferable. Please note that, in a session with three papers, individual presenters should speak no more than twenty minutes. In four-paper sessions, it is expected that individual presenters will speak for no more than fifteen minutes. In each case, the commentary should not exceed ten minutes in order to enable as much audience discussion as possible.

As in the past, all submissions will take place online at the GSA Web site (www. thegsa.org). We have responded to your suggestions and concerns, and we have completely overhauled and updated the entire submission process to make it more seamless and intuitive than at any time in the past. We welcome your comments and ideas. Please go to our Web site at www.thegsa.org/conferences/2008/index. asp for further information.

Call for Papers

GERMAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION THIRTY-SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE

The German Studies Association (GSA) will hold its Thirty-second Annual Conference in St. Paul, Minnesota, 2 October–5 October 2008.

The Program Committee cordially invites proposals on any aspect of German, Austrian, or Swiss Studies, including (but not limited to)history, Germanistik, film, art history, political science, musicology, sociology, and cultural studies. Proposals for entire sessions and for interdisciplinary presentations are strongly encouraged. Individual paper proposals and offers to serve as session moderator or commentator are also welcome. Programs of past GSA conferences may be viewed at the GSA Web site (www.thegsa.org).

Please see the GSA Web site for information about the submission process, which opens on 5 January 2008 and note that ALL proposals must be submitted online; paper forms are not used. **The deadline for proposals is 15 February 2008.**

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For more information, visit the GSA Web site or contact members of the 2008 Program Committee:

Chair: Patricia Herminghouse (University of Rochester)
Diachronic and Other: H. Glenn Penny (University of Iowa)
Medieval, Early Modern, 18th Century: Benjamin Marschke (Humboldt State University)
19th Century (all fields): Brent Peterson (Lawrence University)
20th- and 21st-Century History: Donna Harsch (Carnegie Mellon University)
20th- and 21st-Century Literature and Cultural Studies: Karin Bauer (McGill University)
Political Science: Charlie Jeffery (University of Edinburgh)

Please feel to contact the Program Director (pahe@troi.cc.rochester.edu) or the Executive Director (director@thegsa.org) with questions or comments.

Gerald R. Kleinfeld Funds Professorship at Wartburg College: GSA Contributes to Kleinfeld Lecture/Event Series

Professor Gerald R. Kleinfeld, founding Executive Director of the GSA(1976–2005) and founding editor of the *German Studies Review*, has made a gift of \$ 1 million to fund the Gerald R. Kleinfeld Distinguished Professorship in German History at Wartburg College in Waverly, Iowa. The first Kleinfeld Distinguished Professor is Professor (and GSA member!) Daniel J. Walther, chair of the History Department at Wartburg and author of the study *Creating Germans Abroad: Cultural Policies and National Identity in Namibia* (Ohio University Press, 2002). As Gerry Kleinfeld noted at the time of his gift's announcement, "Wartburg is the last German-immigrant founded college in the United States that still supports active programs and relationships with Germany. The college's positive connections to Germany are important." For further details on the College and on Gerry's remarkable gift, please visit the Wartburg College Web site announcement at www.wartburg.edu/Article.aspx?ID=2150.

The Kleinfeld Distinguished Professorship was officially bestowed on Daniel Walther at a Wartburg College convocation on 9 October. Gerry Kleinfeld was on hand for the occasion, and President Sara Lennox represented the GSA.

At its most recent meeting in San Diego, the GSA Executive Committee expressed its support for Gerry's gift and its appreciation for Gerry's contributions to German Studies by unanimously voting to make a contribution of \$ 20,000 to support the creation of an endowed Gerald R. Kleinfeld Lecture/Event Series at Wartburg College to attach to the Professorship that Gerry has funded personally. It is hoped that members and friends will also now contribute to this permanent lecture series fund, so that the income that it generates can be used for all departments and faculty in German Studies at Wartburg.

Any contributions by individuals would be tax deductible. Checks can be sent to Wartburg College, Office of the Vice President for Advancement, 100 Wartburg Blvd., P.O. Box 1003, Waverly, Iowa 50677–0903. In the memo portion of the check, please write "Kleinfeld Project." If contributing by credit card, please go to the College Web site, www.wartburg.edu, find the menu for ALUMNI/VISITORS, pull down that menu and click on "Give Online," in the lower left side of the screen. IMPORTANT: Just below the credit card information, the form asks what the gift is for. Pull down that menu and select "other." Below it, describe what "other" is for: "Kleinfeld Project."

In a congratulatory letter to Professor Walther, GSA Executive Director David E. Barclay wrote the following, among other things:

Gerry is not only my esteemed—even revered—predecessor as Executive Director, he is also an exemplar, a mentor, and a close personal friend. His is a household name in the world of German Studies and in the world of German-American cultural and educational exchange, equally known in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland as in North America. Thus his decision to make a gift to Wartburg College sends a clear signal to the larger academic world, here and abroad, that institutions like Wartburg (indeed, Wartburg in particular) are critical to the future of German Studies and to the further development of German-American relations. At its last meeting one week ago, the German Studies Association's Executive Committee unanimously and enthusiastically expressed its support, verbally and financially, for Professor Kleinfeld's decision.

Moreover, I can think of no more worthy holder of the Kleinfeld Professorship than you. In many ways, you and your work represent the future of German Studies in North America. I have read your study on Namibia with great interest, both professional and personal It clearly embodies some of the most creative and original scholarship in the world of contemporary German Studies....

So your professorship represents a win-win-win situation for all parties involved. It is an appropriate tribute to and from Gerry Kleinfeld, one of the truly towering figures in the study of the German-speaking world. It is a deserved tribute to you and to your own outstanding scholarly achievements. It is a tribute to Wartburg College and to its continuing role as a beacon of German Studies. And, I hope, it is a tribute to the German Studies Association, the largest organization of its sort in the world, and, along with Wartburg College, the embodiment and the expression of Gerry Kleinfeld's extraordinary career.

Prize Competition for best recent monograph and Ph.D. dissertation

The Center for Austrian Studies at the University of Minnesota announces the current **Prize Competition** to identify the best recent monograph and Ph.D. dissertation written by North American citizens or permanent residents in any discipline in the humanities, social sciences, or fine arts regarding:

- contemporary Austria
- contemporary Austria=s relationship with Central Europe and the European Union
- the history, society, and culture of Austria and the pre-1919 Habsburg lands of Central and Eastern Europe.

The **Austrian Cultural Forum** in New York funds the prizes. The purpose of the biennial competition is to encourage North American scholars in the full range of academic disciplines to do research in the field of Austrian and Habsburg studies.

Prize competition in Austrian studies for books published in the years 2006/2007

The Center for Austrian Studies at the University of Minnesota is pleased to announce the current Prize Competition for the best book in the field of Austrian Studies. The award is funded by the Austrian Cultural Institute in New York. It is the purpose of the competition to encourage North American scholars in the full range of academic disciplines in the humanities, social sciences, or fine arts to publish research on

- contemporary Austria
- contemporary Austria's relationship with Central Europe and the European Union
- the history, society, and culture of Austria and the pre-1919 Habsburg lands of Central and Eastern Europe

The competition will judge works in any discipline relating to these fields. The prize is a monetary award in the amount of 2,000. All works must have been published between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2007.

Nominations may be submitted by the author, publisher, or any other individual. Authors must be residents of North America and must hold U.S., Canadian, or Austrian citizenship. Send nominations with five copies of each nominated work to: Chair, Austrian Prize Committee, Center for Austrian Studies, 314 Social Sciences Building, 267 19th Ave. S., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455.

The deadline for submissions is February 29, 2008. The prize winner will be announced at the conference of the German Studies Association in St. Paul, Minnesota, in early October 2008.

"Germany to Help Open Holocaust Records": Part Two GSA Archive Committee Report 2007

Rainer Hering* Landesarchiv Schleswig-Holstein

"Germany to Help Open Holocaust Records" was the headline news for last year's Archive Committee report.

(1) Still, Arolsen is a crucial topic for the Archive Committee report 2007. The International Tracing Service in Arolsen contains, as was reported last year, some 47 million single information records on 17.5 million persons persecuted by the Nazis—an immense reservoir of documentation for historians. For sixty years, the International Red Cross has used the archived documents to trace missing and dead Jews and forced laborers who were systematically persecuted by Nazi Germany and its antisemitic confederates across central and eastern Europe before and during World War II. For years a semi-secretive committee acting in the name of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva has run the Tracing Service, and for years they have said that "demnächst" ("soon") they would develop rules for scholarly access, but nothing happened. That changed in 2006.

In January 2007, I had the opportunity to visit Arolsen. During the tour of the houses I found by chance several files from Schleswig-Holstein—personnel files of prisoners before 1945—whose existence was not known by anyone in that state. Therefore one can assume that there could be discovered a lot of important information for historians.

But there had been severe problems to be solved. Arolsen contains copies of material given to them by the state and city archives after 1955. These are personnel files, mainly index cards, which had been incorporated into a giant personnel-data based card index. It would take several years to separate this material. The German archival laws prohibit giving access to many of them during a particular period of time without a special permit. The Archivreferentenkonferenz des Bundes und der Länder, which is the permanent conference of the leading archivists of the Bundesarchiv and the state archives has not been informed in time about the situation in Arolsen and the planned opening. Just a week before the GSA meeting in San Diego the conference had been able to find a solution to give historians access even to these files. A digitized copy of many of the records is being deposited in installments in the US Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington even while the process of getting final approval for public access is still not completed. The GSA has to see how the use of the Arolsen files works out in practice. If anyone hears about it or has experiences of his/her own, please let the archive committee know.

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(2) Norman Goda reports: The Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group (IWG) officially concluded its work in March 2007. The IWG was created as a response to the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998, according to which all classified records in the custody of US government agencies concerning Nazi war crimes and war criminals were to be turned over to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) for public access. The IWG's work was extended by Congress in 2005 so that the Central Intelligence Agency would have time to comply with the Act's provisions.

The seven-year, thirty million dollar declassification effort has resulted in the release of well over eight million pages of materials, mostly from the Office of Strategic Services, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State, and the US Army Counter Intelligence Corps. NARA staff is still working on public releases in two areas:

(a) Central Intelligence Agency Records:

Since 2005 the CIA has conducted a re-review of its records and has turned over new versions of files originally released between 2001 and 2005 as well as files not previously released. The totals in terms of declassified CIA files turned over to the NARA are as follows:

959 Nazi-related NAME Files

11 Other Nazi-related Files

38 Nazi-related SUBJECT Files

55 CIA Operational Files (concerning postwar Germany)

31 Japanese-related NAME Files

4 Japanese SUBJECT Files

Total: 1098 CIA files submitted.

As of July 2007, about 1000 of these files are available to researchers. The remaining 100 files will be available by the end of the year.

(b) US Army Counter Intelligence Files:

Also in the process of declassification are approximately 20,000 US Army files relevant to the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act created by different parts of the Army Counter Intelligence Corps units active in Germany and Austria. The files are still tied up in major electronic processing problems. The Army used what is now an obsolete software program for scanning this 35-mm microfilm. Part of the scanned information is corrupted. Presently these records are NOT AVAILABLE for research while National Archives staff solves electronic access to the records.

These records date roughly from 1945–1970. NARA has a compiled list of Names & Subjects in a database. The list of files holds great promise in the future for research.

The extension of the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure and Imperial Japanese Records Law from March 2005 to March 2007 has primarily affected the release of records controlled by the CIA. It is important for those who have utilized previously released CIA records to know that in many cases a new review by the agency has led to a 18 major

major reduction in the amount of text redacted in the earlier review, so that scholars need to look at these documents again. In addition, the agency has adopted the interpretation of relevance that all other agencies of the government had followed and, as a result, has reviewed and opened large quantities of additional files. These pertain to SS officers with whom the agency or its predecessors had some ties in the postwar era, other individuals in whom the agency was interested, and stay-behind organizations established for the contingency of Warsaw-Pact forces overrunning central and west European areas. There is also a damage assessment in the case of the Soviet spy Felfe. Although the conference on which it was based was held in 2003, the book containing its papers and edited by David Bankier, Secret Intelligence and the Holocaust (published jointly by Yad Vashem and Enigma Books), will, like the earlier book by Richard Breitman et al. (U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis), provide many useful leads for scholars interested in the newly declassified records. It should be noted that, although the law will expire in March 2007, for reasons related to the technical problems of processing some of the records being released, there is going to be further new material that will become accessible to scholars after that date.

(3) 40 Years of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA):

The National Security Archive released information on the Freedom of Information Act on July 2, 2007: 40 Years of FOIA, 20 Years of Delay. The oldest FOIA requests still pending in the federal government were first filed two decades ago, during the Reagan presidency. Five agencies have pending info requests older than 15 years—the oldest pending since 1987, 1988 and 1989. Knight Open Government Survey by National Security Archive finds agencies misled Congress on the oldest request. In January 2007, the Archive filed FOIA requests with the 87 leading federal agencies and components for copies of their "ten oldest open or pending" FOIA requests. The Department of State, responding to an Archive "ten oldest" request for the first time, reported ten pending requests older than 15 years—the majority of the oldest requests in the entire federal government. Other agencies with the oldest requests include the Air Force, CIA, and two components of the Justice Department, the Criminal Division and the FBI. For more information see: <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB224/index.htm>.

(4) Astrid Eckert reports:

(a) The Eco-Archiv in Hofgeismar, founded in 1986, holds a collection on nature, tourism, sport, grass-root movements for the protection of nature etc. It is being used by American scholars of environmental history and tourism. The archive in Hofgeismar closes down and is currently (summer 2007) in transit to a new location. It will become part of the Archiv der sozialen Demokratie of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Bonn. It is not known when the entire collection will be available for use again. Presumably, the new host institution will eventually be able to answer related questions.

(b) Berliner Humboldt-Uni: Teile der wissenschaftlichen Sammlungen im Inter-

net, rund 14 000 Stücke aus den wissenschaftlichen Sammlungen der Berliner Humboldt-Universität können von Mittwoch, 23. Mai an, im Netz betrachtet werden. Unter der Adresse < http://www.sammlungen.hu-berlin.de> befinden sich in digitalisierter Form etwa frühe Grafiken aus der Bibliothek der Universität, Objekte aus einer historischen Instrumentensammlung und Mikropräparate der Zoologischen Lehrsammlung. Der Hochschule zufolge können viele der Ausstellungsstücke erstmals von der Öffentlichkeit betrachtet werden, weil die entsprechenden Archive nicht zugänglich waren oder es immer noch nicht sind. Alle auf der Webseite abgebildeten Objekte sind mit Schlagworten versehen und in vielen Fällen untereinander verknüpft.

(5) The general situation of archives in Germany, Austria and Switzerland has been pointed out extensively in our 2006 report and can be skipped this year.

We welcome questions, complaints and information from our members bearing on archival research on German history and culture. And I hope we will have sessions on archival questions again at the GSA conferences. Suggestions are most welcome!

Inauguration of GSA Junior Faculty Caucus

At this year's GSA Meeting, a group of junior faculty gathered and decided to organize a Caucus to articulate and serve particular desires of junior faculty members. As its first step, the group will propose a Caucus-sponsored Round Table. This Round Table will be coordinated by Lynne Fallwell (l.fallwell@ttu.edu) in cooperation with the Graduate Student Caucus. In the future, the Caucus hopes to organize a Conference Happy Hour Lounge and to send a liaison to the Business Meeting. Participation of all junior faculty in the Caucus is welcome.

To offer input or to be placed on the very low traffic email list, please contact: Jennifer Ruth Hosek (jhosek@queensu.ca) and Beverly Weber (beverly. weber@colorado.edu)

Inauguration of GSA Graduate Students Caucus

An interdisciplinary group of graduate students studying Germany gathered at this year's GSA conference to initiate a GSA Caucus for graduate students. The ultimate goal of the Caucus is to provide a forum for graduate students to discuss their place in and their contribution to the GSA, as well as their expectations from the Association. The group identified the need for enhanced communication between faculty members and graduate students present at the GSA, as well as among the students themselves. All graduate students are welcome to participate in the Caucus and to offer their input on the following ideas discussed:

First, a breakfast sponsored by the GSA Graduate Students Caucus at the next GSA annual convention. The breakfast will be organized by Evan Torner (etorner@german.umass.edu).

Second, submission of a proposal for a roundtable of the GSA Junior Faculty and Gradaute Students Caucuses, where we can exchange ideas about research interests, trends in the field and professional development. This Round Table will be coordinated by Lynne Fallwell (l.fallwell@ttu.edu).

To contribute ideas and suggestions, please contact Mariana Ivanova and Evan Torner (marianaivanova@mail.utexas.edu and etorner@german.umass.edu).

The GSA and Affiliated/Related Organizations

[We are continuing the practice, begun in the Spring 2007 issue, of publishing brief self-descriptions of organizations with which the GSA is linked or which may be of interest to our members. In this issue we are highlighting the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS) and the International Association for the Study of German Politics (IASGP).]

American Institute for Contemporary German Studies

The American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS) strengthens the German-American relationship in an evolving Europe and changing world. The Institute produces objective and original analyses of developments and trends in Germany, Europe, and the United States; creates new transatlantic networks; and facilitates dialogue among the business, political, and academic communities to manage differences and define and promote common interests.

Affiliated with Johns Hopkins University, AICGS provides a comprehensive program of public forums, policy studies, research, and study groups designed to enrich the political, corporate, and scholarly constituencies it serves.

The Institute accomplishes its mission through a variety of ways. By publishing in-depth analyses of public policy concerns as well as short Issue Briefs which provide a quick snapshot of a problem, AICGS' written material provides not only background information but also policy recommendations for today's and tomorrow's policy makers. The AICGS Advisor, our bi-weekly electronic newsletter, offers a wide variety of topics and essays by leading scholars and journalists.

Das American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS) stärkt die deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen in einem wachsenden Europa und einer sich verändernden Welt. Das Institut veröffentlicht objektive und innovative Analysen von Entwicklungen und Trends in Deutschland, Europa und den Vereinigten Staaten. Es schafft neue transatlantische Netzwerke und ermöglicht den Dialog zwischen Wirtschaft, Wissenschaft, Politik und Gesellschaft. Dadurch werden Missverständnisse beseitigt und gemeinsame Interessen entdeckt und gefördert. AICGS ist an die Johns Hopkins Universität angegliedert und bietet ein umfangreiches Spektrum an öffentlichen Foren, Forschungs- und Arbeitsgruppen sowie Studien zur Politik und zu politischen Entwicklungen an, die Experten und Interessenten aus Politik, Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft zuverlässig informieren und zur Diskussion anregen.

Das Institut erreicht seine Ziele durch eine Vielzahl von Formaten und Veröffentlichungen. Unsere detaillierten Analysen zu politischen und wirtschaftlichen Problemen sowie unsere kürzeren *Issue Briefs*, die ein Problem und Lösungen in komprimierter Form darstellen, liefern nicht nur Hintergrundinformationen sondern auch Lösungsvorschläge für die Entscheidungsträger von heute und morgen. Der *AICGS Advisor*, unser zweiwöchentlicher elektronischer *Newsletter*, bietet unserem Publikum zudem eine große Anzahl von Themen und Aufsätzen von führenden 22

Wissenschaftlern und Journalisten.

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Wenn Sie unsere Analysen und den *AICGS Advisor* erhalten möchten, sprechen Sie uns einfach an!

For more information, please contact: info@aicgs.org Or visit our Web site: www.aicgs.org

PUBLIC POLICY REPORTS

U.S. and German Approaches to the Energy Challenge By Wilfrid Kohl and Friedemann Müller Public Policy Report #29 (2007)

Innovation in the United States and Germany: Case Studies By Michel Clement, Theo Dingermann, Yali Friedman, Dorothee Heisenberg, Alexander Jahn, Max Keilbach, Sean Safford, and Richard Seline Public Policy Report #27 (2007)

GERMAN-AMERICAN ISSUES

Reconciling Religion and Public Life: Essays on Pluralism and Fundamentalism in the United States and Germany By Patrick J. Deneen, Türkan Karakurt, Charles T. Mathewes, Erik Owens, and Rolf Schieder German-American Issues #7 (2007)

ISSUE BRIEFS Religion and World Politics: A Structural Approach By Timothy A. Byrnes Issue Brief #16 (August 2007) Boeing vs. Airbus: The WTO Dispute Neither Can Win By Eric Heymann Issue Brief #14 (March 2007)

WORKING PAPERS Conference Report: German and American Policies Toward Russia: Transatlantic and Global Dimensions By Angela Stent (August 2007)

The International Association for the Study of German Politics

The International Association for the Study of German Politics is the new organization that has been created by a merger of the UK Association for the Study of German Politics and the US German Politics Association. The new association brings together scholars from Europe and North America into a single academic network.

From National Groups to International Association

The UK Association for the Study of German Politics was established in 1974 to promote the study and teaching of German politics, economics, and society, in the widest possible context, amongst new and established scholars within the United Kingdom and further afield. Among its co-founders were William Paterson (University of Birmingham), Peter Pulzer (University of Oxford), and Marianne Howarth (Nottingham Trent University).

The US German Politics Association was formerly known as the Conference Group on German Politics. It was founded in 1968 as an independent organization of scholars devoting a major portion of their professional work to the study of German society and politics. Co-founders of the CGGP included George Romoser (University of New Hampshire) and Charles Foster (U.S. Department of Education), along with Alfred Diamont (Indiana University).

As separate UK and US associations ASGP and GPA provided a framework for at least two "successor generations" of scholars working on German politics to develop their expertise. The newly established IASGP provides a powerful transatlantic platform for exchange and dialogue, the promotion of the study of German politics in European and North American scholarly communities, and for encouraging new generations of researchers on Germany to develop their skills.

The focus of the IASGP is on German-speaking states, and not solely on Germany. To this end, specialists on the former GDR, Austria and Switzerland are active within the Association and add to its expertise.

Membership Benefits

The IASGP offers a number of membership benefits:

• Members receive *German Politics*, the journal of the International Association for the Study of German Politics (IASGP). *German Politics*, now in its fifteenth volume, is an international forum for academic debate and political analysis on Germany, its changing role in European and world affairs, and its internal structures including political economy, constitutional law, and social analysis. It engages with themes that connect Germany comparatively with other states—the challenges of globalization, changes in international relations, and the widening and deepening of the European Union. It also links work on Germany to wider debates and issues in comparative politics, public policy,

political behavior, and political theory. *German Politics* is published four times a year by Routledge. The editors welcome submissions from scholars of German political economy, law and society as well as on issues related to German and comparative politics.

- IASGP runs its own annual conference in the UK, holds panels at GSA and APSA, and holds periodic workshops and smaller conferences. Members have preferential rates at the UK conference and may propose papers to IASGP panels at GSA and APSA.
- IASGP runs a week-long election visit at each Bundestag election, organizing briefings from all the main parties, and discussions with opinion polling companies, the political foundations, the UK and US embassies and other organizations in Berlin. Election night is spent touring the various party headquarters.
- The IASGP runs **networks for graduate students**, including prizes for best papers presented at IASGP-related conferences, and offers support to graduate students to participate in events, workshops, and conferences.
- The IASGP acts as a **communications hub** for members, with a twice-yearly Newsletter and a new Web site which has news on events and publications and a members-only section for exchanging ideas between meetings.

Getting Involved

The IASGP is run by an Executive Committee, currently chaired by Professor Charlie Jeffery (University of Edinburgh), which is responsible to an Annual General Meeting of members. The AGM is now held alternately at the UK annual conference and at the GSA conference in the US.

IASGP ran a number of events at the GSA conference this year in San Diego to raise awareness and get new members involved. The response was very strong indeed and looks set to take the organization to a new level. We hope that many others join us and become active in the Association. You can join online at http://www.iasgp.org/membership.asp. I look forward to hearing from you!

Charlie Jeffery IASGP Chair

Issues and Discussions in German Studies

[As noted in the last two newsletters, the GSA is providing a forum for continuing discussion of issues and topics in German Studies. We are continuing this practice by publishing the texts of three papers that have been presented in recent months. The first, by GSA Executive Director David E. Barclay, was presented at the founding conference of the International Association for the Study of German Politics at Edinburgh in May 2007. The second and third, by Professors Charlie Jeffery and Peter Gay, were delivered at the GSA's Thirty-first Annual Conference in San Diego in October 2007. Professor Gay was ill, and his paper was read in his behalf by his friend and former student, Professor Helmut Walser Smith of Vanderbilt University. We welcome your own responses to these papers, just as we urge you to write about any German Studies-related issue that is important to you. It should be noted that these papers have not been edited for publication in journals, and thus retain their "lecture" quality.]

Transatlantic Cooperation in an Age of Transnationalism: The Future of German Studies¹

David E. Barclay Executive Director, GSA

I should begin with the usual disclaimers. First, I am not a political scientist or an expert on contemporary German politics, so I'm a bit of an interloper here, where I'm speaking largely as a result of my function within the German Studies Association. I would feel a lot more qualified to speak about Prussia in the 1850s or West Berlin in the 1950s! Second, I am speaking here today only for myself, not in any official capacity as the "voice" of the GSA: a voice which in any case doesn't exist. As you will soon hear, I am going to draw some conclusions that will range from the skeptical to the pessimistic, and I am sure that many—perhaps most—of my fellow GSA members would disagree with what I am about to say.

Let me begin with a couple of recent news stories that will get me right to the heart of my topic. Just last week Peter Löscher, an Austrian who had been working at the top levels of an American—but really global and transnational—pharmaceutical concern was chosen to head the *Vorstand* of Siemens, a German—but really global and transnational—concern. In so doing he seems to be following somewhat in the footsteps of two fellow Austrians, Wolfgang Puck and Arnold Schwarzenegger, who are at once global figures who live in the United States and transcend the boundaries and limitations of culture and nationality.

But just a few weeks earlier the former German Defense Minister and current

¹Talk presented at annual meeting of Association for the Study of German Politics, Edinburgh, 30 May 2007

Social Democratic Fraktionsvorsitzender Peter Struck had this to say in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: "Wir müssen gleiche Nähe haben zwischen uns und Amerika einerseits, uns und Russland andererseits."² So Rapallo meets Raketenabwehr, and as an American observer one is permitted to wonder what kind of future NATO has. But it is not just Schröderite Social Democrats who are speaking in these or similar tones. Richard von Weizsäcker recently warned the EU that it should stick together because the United States is heading toward some kind of horrific crisis, and thus, he seemed to imply, the US is not a reliable partner. And a couple of months ago I took part in a conference of Russian and German Nachkriegshistoriker where I was the only non-German and non-Russian interloper. We were given a grand tour of the Bayerischer Landtag, where our host was a CSU-Abgeordneter who, apparently not knowing or caring that an American was in his midst, launched into a particularly bitter diatribe against the US generally and against the *Raketenabwehr* in particular. I was, perhaps a bit naively, somewhat startled to hear this coming from a CSU politician. We can, of course, continue with examples like these forever; and most of you probably know better ones than I do, such as the recent Pew survey which show that sixty-six percent of Germans-the highest percentage among the twelve European countries polled-have an unfavorable view of the United States.³

My major point here—and this will be one of the two central theses of my remarks to follow—is that the transatlantic German-American relationship, and transatlantic collaboration more generally, is being transformed by the simultaneity of a genuinely globalizing transnationality, on the one hand, and an intensification of national and cultural alienation between Germans and Americans on the other, an alienation that in my view goes far beyond unhappiness with George W. Bush. My first conclusion will be that, on a certain level, we have to look critically at the last fifty or sixty years of German-American academic and cultural exchange, go beyond the customary pieties, and wonder just what the results have really been.

This will lead me to my second larger thesis, in which I shall argue that the

² "Interview mit dem Fraktionsvorsitzenden Dr. Peter Struck, FAZ, 6. Mai 2007," http:// www.spdfraktion.de/cnt/rs/rs_dok/0,,40954,00.html (accessed 22 May 2007). But see the warnings from the camps of the CDU and the Greens: "Politiker der Grünen und der CDU warnten die SPD vor einem zu engen Verhältnis zu Moskau. Der Grünen-Vorsitzende Reinhard Bütikofer und der außenpolitische Sprecher der Unionsfraktion im Bundestag, Eckart von Klaeden, wandten sich gegen die kürzlich vom SPD-Fraktionsvorsitzenden Peter Struck erhobene Forderung, Deutschland müsse gleiche Nähe zu Amerika und zu Russland haben. Die Äquidistanz-Theorie erweise sich bei näherem Hinsehen als Sprengsatz für den europäischen Zusammenhalt, schrieb Bütikofer in einem Gastbeitrag für die "Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung". Gleicher Abstand zu Amerika und Russland sei Wasser auf die Mühlen jener in den neuen Mitgliedstaaten, die ohnehin nicht viel auf die NATO oder die EU gäben, erklärte von Klaeden." *Wirtschaftswoche* online site: http://www.wiwo. de/pswiwo/fn/ww2/sfn/buildww/id/125/id/271513/fm/0/artpage/1/artprint/0/SH/0/depot/0/ index.html (accessed 22 May 2007).

³ Figures updated after I presented this paper in May 2007: The Pew Global Attitudes Project, "Global Unease with Major World Powers: A 47-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey," 27 June 2007 < http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/256.pdf>.

phenomenon of "German Studies," however that concept is defined, has to be reassessed and critically reevaluated if it is going to endure—above all at the academic level—in the twenty-first century. Because here too the signs are not exactly encouraging. To be sure, and as I shall note at the end, some interesting and controversial new developments are underway, but again I am not too sure about their chances for success.

After that grim introduction, perhaps we can gain some consolation from history. Although it seems to me that we are dealing with something quantitatively if not qualitatively new when we talk about the prospects of transatlantic cooperation and German Studies in an age of transnationalism, it might well be that the present historical conjuncture has witnessed a partial return to older themes, older tropes, and older stereotypes in the complex German-American relationship: that, in other words (and this will hardly be an original argument, especially in this group), the Cold War really was a kind of historical blip in this regard as well. In a wonderful essay published about a decade ago, Hans-Jürgen Grabbe reminded us that German Amerikamüdigkeit has been around almost as long as the republic itself: Witness Ferdinand Kürnberger's 1855 novel, Der Amerika-Müde, a kind of counterpart to Ernst Willkomm's Die Europamüden from 1838. The main character in Kürnberger's novel is based on the real-life Romantic poet Nikolaus Lenau, who was bitterly disillusioned by his experience in the United States, which he called *die verschweinten Staaten* and which, he noted, neither had nightingales nor deserved them.⁴ To be sure, certain anti-American tropes have been modified by the realities of globalization and the blurred boundaries between globalization and Americanization. The current debate about building a McDonald's in Kreuzberg is an example, with the usual arguments about standardization and the destruction of rain forests and the threat to Kreuzberg Kiezkultur becoming caught up in more general critiques of what one young Kreuzberger, in the words of Der Tagesspiegel, described as "die Scheiß-Amis." And of course there is a Web page at www. keinmcdoofinkreuzberg.de.5

And not to be overlooked on the other side of the Atlantic is what might be called American *Europamüdigkeit*, ranging from hostility to a more generalized and long-standing indifference to Europe generally, including Germany.⁶ Some

⁴ Hans-Jürgen Grabbe, "Weary of Germany—Weary of America: Perceptions of the United States in Nineteenth-Century Germany," in *Transatlantic Images and Perceptions: Germany and America since 1776*, ed. David E. Barclay and Elisabeth Glaser-Schmidt (Cambridge, 1997), 69–70.

⁵ On European anti-Americanism, see, above all, Andrei S. Markovits, *Uncouth Nation: Why Europe Dislikes America* (Princeton, 2007).

⁶ Apart from Iraq, the only foreign news story to which Americans paid any attention at all, in the week of 7 May, was Tony Blair's resignation. 12% of those surveyed said they had followed the story, but for only 3% was it the top story. The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, "Iraq and Tornadoes Top the News: Who Cares about American Idol?" (17 May 2007), http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=328 (accessed 23 May 2007).

of these trends reflect well-known cultural, demographic, and geographic shifts in the United States that hardly need to be mentioned here, but which are rapidly contributing to a rather rapid de-"Europeanization," if one may call it that, of the larger society. Then there has been a spate of what one might call Anglo-American "Eurabia" books that worry about Europe's demographic and cultural future and the growth of European Islam. These range of course from the work of Melanie Phillips to recent books by Mark Steyn, Ian Buruma, and Walter Laqueur, most of which have gotten relatively little attention in continental Europe itself but in some cases, like Steyn, have been widely read in the US and I think do reflect the views of a significant segment of the American public.⁷ Perhaps more surprising is the growing hostility or indifference to Europe among left-leaning American academic elites, and this represents the clear point of transition to the heart of my remarks today.

My evidence for this is, admittedly, at least partially anecdotal. I know of no surveys on the topic of academics' attitudes toward Europe and Germany, and I would be skeptical of their results in any case. But for thirteen years, before I became Executive Director of the GSA, I directed a so-called Title VI program in Western European Studies funded by the US Department of Education, and in that context we had plenty of opportunities to assess the study of-and the place of-Europe generally and Germany particularly in the constellation of US higher education. The trends were not and are not good. We do have figures about language enrollments at US colleges and universities. To be sure, German remains in third place among foreign languages studied by American undergraduate and post-graduate students, behind Spanish, which is far in first place, and just behind French. In 1995, 443,069 US university students at four-year and/or post-graduate institutions were learning Spanish out of about a million in all, and by 2002 that had increased to 525,638. During that same period the number of American students learning German declined from 84,574 to 78,790. The executive director of the Modern Language Association told me a few months ago that German enrollments have been up slightly in recent years, but the general trend is fairly obvious, especially when one notes that the fastest growing languages at American universities and colleges are American Sign Language, Italian, Chinese, Japanese, Arabic, Biblical Hebrew, and Modern Hebrew. In 1968, 19.2 percent of all American university students who were learning a foreign language were studying German, but by 2002 that had declined to 6.5 percent. Spanish had risen from 32.4 to 53.4 percent in the same period.8

⁷ For example, see Bat Ye'Or, *Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis* (Madison, New Jersey, 2005); Melanie Phillips, *Londonistan* (London, 2006); Claire Berlinski, *Menace In Europe: Why the Continent's Crisis Is America's, Too* (New York, 2006); Mark Steyn, *America Alone: The End of the World as We Know It* (New York, 2006); Bruce Bawer, *While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam Is Destroying the West from Within* (New York, 2006); Ian Buruma, *Murder in Amsterdam: The Death of Theo van Gogh and the Limits of Tolerance* (New York, 2006); Walter Laqueur, *The Last Days of Europe: Epitaph for an Old Continent* (New York, 2007); Ayaan Hirsi Ali, *Infidel* (New York, 2007).

More anecdotally, but based on years of observation, it does seem to me that the general mood and general trend among US academics is moving away from Europe and thus from Germany, for a variety of reasons. In the US, as in the UK, Hobbesian conflicts for continued funding of specific teaching lines are the order of the day, and German departments really have to struggle with the competition. There are no guarantees any more that if, say, a professor of German history retires, he or she will be replaced with a young historian of Germany. Quite the opposite is likely to happen. And we can't even be assured that a scholar of the Germanspeaking world will be replaced with a Europeanist or even a comparativist upon his or retirement. I have heard colleagues from other fields or disciplines justifying the elimination of "European" positions in terms of the (supposedly) growing irrelevance of Europe itself, especially in relation to other parts of the world—a view that one encounters not infrequently. This is not mere paranoia on my part. Increasingly the study of Europe, including German-speaking Europe, is no longer a Selbstverständlichkeit. Even when one does not encounter outright hostility to the study of Europe, which one sometimes does, the reality is that the universitylevel study of Europe and of the German-speaking communities within Europe is increasingly being seen within the context of transnational approaches that tend to break down and call into question older concepts not only of the nation-state but even of Sprach- und Kulturräume. This is a point that I hardly need to belabor before a group like this, and its consequences for what we are calling German Studies-which I really will get to in a minute-are considerable.

In this context, and in the context of the longer-term problems of the German-American relationship, I also increasingly wonder about the longer-term efficacy—in terms of their general contributions to mutual cultural comprehension and empathy—of the numerous German-American exchanges that emerged after World War II. This may seem like a very odd thing to say, and as one who benefited immensely from the DAAD, the SSRC, the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung, and most recently the American Academy in Berlin, I may seem like an ungrateful biter of hands that have fed me most generously for several decades. But if in fact mutual comprehension and empathy are critical components of academic and other cultural exchanges, I fear that, *etwas überspitzt formuliert* (but not too much!), these programs have tended to be one-way streets, with, it seems to me, Americans learning a *lot* more about Germany and deriving much more from these experiences than the other way around.

For example, I continue to be depressed about the persistence in Germany, among people who have traveled to and lived in the United States, of older cultural stereotypes and clichés dating back to the *Amerikamüden* and even before. I am distressed by the poor quality of German journalism about the United States and the low level of German reporting from the United States. One of the *rühmliche Ausnahmen*, in my view, is Josef Joffe at *Die Zeit*; and I can't help but think that

⁸ Elizabeth B. Welles, *Foreign Language Enrollments in United States Institutions of Higher Education, Fall 2002* (Washington, DC: Modern Language Association, 2003), accessible at http://www.adfl.org/resources/enrollments.pdf (accessed 23 May 2007).

his ability, unique I suspect among German journalists, to quote Yogi Berra reflects the fact that he went to a high school in Grand Rapids, right in Flyover Country, and not on the east coast or the west coast.⁹ But all too often, or so it seems to this Florida native and Michigan resident, academic exchange programs from Germany to the United States often wind up with Germans—students, professors, journalists—landing in intellectual bubbles from which they all too rarely emerge. Nothing against the Kennedy School or the Wilson Center or the Center for Advanced Study or the National Humanities Center or the rest of them, or against the elite research universities. But I really wish that our German visitors would open themselves up more for other possibilities. As one hopeful sign, and now I am really going to sound disgracefully self-serving, just a few months ago the *FAZ* published a full-page article under the headline "Kalamazoo statt Yale," suggesting that, as an immersion-based cultural experience for German university students on exchange programs, small liberal-arts colleges offer better opportunities than the prestigious research institutions on the coasts.¹⁰ So maybe things will change.

It does seem to me, though, that American and German scholars, at least in the humanities and perhaps in the social sciences, really are drifting apart and talking to each other less. This growing Atlantic scholarly divide has recently been addressed in the last two newsletters of the German Studies Association, with Hans-Peter Söder of the University of Munich (and director of a very successful US exchange program involving Wayne State University in Detroit) arguing that US scholarship on Germany in general, and the GSA in particular, demonstrate "certain political and even hegemonic trends" that threaten transatlantic scholarly collaboration. Among other things, he instances certain American methodological and theoretical concerns-among them our fascination with ideas of transnationalism, postcoloniality, cultural studies, and the like-and a growing unwillingness of younger American scholars to engage themselves directly with the actual Germany of 2007. As Söder writes, in describing what he calls the Zweigleisigkeit of GSA conferences, "There are German Germans who stoically present their Wissenschaft (with very few Americans in attendance), and there are American Germanists who pursue German studies that have no counterpart to what is happening now in Germany-and never the twain shall meet."11

Whether or not one agrees with Söder, or for that matter with *me*, I do worry about a continuing transatlantic scholarly *Auseinanderdriften*, and this is certainly one factor among many that are creating some important problems for the enterprise that we call German Studies. In an age in which transatlantic scholarly collaboration and cultural exchange—and indeed transatlantic cultural communication in general– are facing serious strains, and in which we are confronting the realities of globalization and, if you will, transnationalism, what is the future of region-based

⁹ See Josef Joffe, Überpower: The Imperial Temptation of America (New York, 2006).

¹⁰Katja Gelinsky, "Kalamazoo statt Yale. Neue Elite-Unis," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, no. 233 (7 October 2006), C8.

¹¹ Hans-Peter Söder, "From 1776 to 2006: Another Declaration of Independence? Some Remarks on the Two Cultures at the GSA," *GSA Newsletter* 31, no. 2 (Winter 2006): 38–43.

area studies? What is the future of scholarship based on the acquisition of forms of local knowledge? What *is* the future—or, rather, what *are* the futures—of German Studies as an integrative, interdisciplinary, multinational, dare I say it *transnational* approach to the study of the German-speaking world in all its dimensions and ramifications? And what implications do these questions have for *your* work as scholars of German politics?

1) One possibility is that German Studies, as practiced in the United States, might simply continue as before, on the grounds that it *already* represents an effective intellectual response to the problems that I've articulated in my rather pessimistic comments so far. With your indulgence, let me quote you some key passages from the GSA curriculum guidelines, revised in 2001:

German Studies is a dynamic and growing field that provides a new paradigm for studying the record, experience, and legacy of the German-speaking peoples of Europe. In a general atmosphere of concern and uncertainty, where student enrollments in some European languages are declining or stagnating and the usefulness of traditional area studies is increasingly questioned, German Studies has emerged as a curricular initiative that promises cooperation and success.

Because German Studies is interdisciplinary, work in the field involves the interaction of differing methodologies. Like other fields of investigation that are served by more than one academic approach (e.g. public health or foreign affairs), many topics in German Studies call for an approach from the perspective of diverse disciplines. For instance, the study of national identities, the Holocaust, urban culture, and gender roles requires grounding in more than one discipline. Faculty in different disciplines can advance interdisciplinary cooperation by learning the methodologies and understanding the standards of scholarship in other disciplines. The attainment of proficiency in the German language is an integral part of German Studies at all levels.

Based on this document, one might argue that German Studies is already poised to respond creatively and imaginatively to the challenges of transnational approaches to historical, cultural, and political reality. This was certainly implied by Michael Geyer in his luncheon talk at last year's GSA, which several of you attended. Geyer argued that an overtly *trans*national approach to history allows for us to think in new and imaginative ways about *national* histories. As he put it, "the main attraction of transnational history for historians of Germany is undoubtedly the extension of a historiography that thinks of Germany and the Germans from the margins and peripheries." Thus, he argues, transnational history gives us more German history, not less; it reminds us that the nation and the world are critically entangled in ways that, he says, are "vital and indispensable" to all of us who concern ourselves with the German-speaking world.¹²

¹² Michael Geyer, "Where Germans Dwell: Transnationalism in Theory and Practice," *GSA Newsletter* 31, no. 2 (Winter 2006): 29–37.

One may or may not agree with Geyer's arguments. But they leave unanswered several critical problems that we face, both conceptually and organizationally and practically, as we try to develop a German Studies for the future. In the May 2007 issue of the GSA newsletter, our current President, Sara Lennox, calls attention to Hans-Peter Söder's concerns, and worries that what American scholars may regard as exciting and cutting-edge and innovative may well simply be regarded in other academic cultures, including German-speaking ones, as superficial, as trendy, and as examples of the ways in which even unwitting American academics "can be regarded by non-Americans as arrogant purveyors of a cultural imperialism enabled by superior access to academic resources. We may indeed need to check our conception of ourselves as the German scholarly vanguard, with the German cultural Bummelzug following somewhere far behind, as Söder suggests."13 For his part, Söder interprets Geyer's speech less as a reflection on new methodological impulses than as a kind of American intellectual declaration of independence from Europe: but not one that necessarily bodes well for transatlantic cooperation or, he implies, for the future of a truly international approach to German Studies, an approach that involves translation—in the real sense of *Über*setzen—at least as much as transnationalism.

And then there are the very practical problems of continuing German Studies as we have done in the past. I've already referred to these things, and anyone who has ever attended a GSA conference knows what I'm talking about. We've been talking about it within the GSA for years. That is the tendency for conference participants to hang out with fellow disciplinary practitioners, for historians to hang out with historians, GermanistInnen to associate with GermanistInnen, political scientists with political scientists, to a certain extent Germans with Germans and Americans with Americans, and so on. Now this may be inevitable, at least to a degree, reflecting socialization patterns, the continuing reality of discipline-based approaches to the formal organization of knowledge, and so on. We can be frank: Most of our efforts to be truly, creatively, passionately interdisciplinary have so far not worked terribly well.

But is this inevitable? Every year in early May, half a mile from my house in Kalamazoo, Michigan, a few thousand medievalists from around the world gather every year, the largest conference of its sort anywhere. I regularly interlope at the International Congress on Medieval Studies and am constantly struck by the ways in which medievalists *do* manage to communicate effectively across disciplinary lines. This may have to do with the kinds of evidence and sources available to them; I don't know. But perhaps—perhaps—it might suggest that our first future model of German Studies, continuing as before and hoping for the best, may not be either workable or desirable or inevitable.

2) A possible second future model for German Studies might be derived from discussions that are currently underway in the Modern Language Association and are now being talked about in non-language departments as well. In late 2006—again, you can read details of this in Sara Lennox's presidential letter in the May 2007

¹³ Sara Lennox, "Letter from the President," GSA Newsletter 32, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 10.

GSA newsletter, and it's also been widely reported online and elsewhere—an MLA committee on foreign languages recommended that university language departments in the US "jettison the traditional model" by which language instruction is followed by literary study. The study of literature would be decentered, and language departments would become more attuned to "the real educational needs of a global society and economy" with the goal of encouraging "transcultural understanding" through the ability to interpret "cultural narratives." In other words, are German Departments being asked themselves to become interdisciplinary German Studies that may save the study of things German from university administrators and reinvigorate the interdisciplinary approaches that organizations such as the GSA embrace?

Well, here too we encounter conceptual and practical problems. For one thing, and as Sara Lennox notes in her otherwise positive take on such ideas, scholars who have been trained in literary analysis and critical theory are rarely in a position to say much about history, economics, or politics. Of course, one way to get around this is by following what I would call, in another outburst of regional chauvinism, the University of Michigan Model, and that is to assign non-GermanistInnen, such as historians and political scientists, to expanded German Studies departments. This has so far, as far as I can see, worked pretty effectively at Michigan, but it begs the question of the traditional disciplinary approach to knowledge and the very understandable desire of disciplinary practitioners to continue to be involved with, say, fellow historians or GermanistInnen or political scientists.¹⁴ That's one reason why all of you belong to this association, and why I like to attend the Midwest German History Workshop or attend sessions of the Conference Group for Central European History or go to the German Historical Institutes in Washington and London.

And then there's yet another problem with the idea of all of us united together under the banner of interdisciplinary cultural studies, and one which is especially germane to all of you here today: and that is the relative non-receptivity of certain disciplines, such as political science in the United States, to forms of local-knowledge expertise and to area studies in general. For years we have been worried about the declining presence of political science within the GSA, and in our discussions—including several with some of you who are gathered here today—we hear a lot about rational choice, about comparative model-building, and so on, and we hear from political scientists that the existing reward structures within political science in the US work against the kinds of interdisciplinary collaboration that the GSA supports, even if that collaboration need not take place under the aegis of cultural studies as practiced in language departments. To be sure, I've heard lately that the so-called "constructivists" within your discipline may be more amenable

¹⁴ Robert C. Post, Yale Law School, recently presented a spirited defense of disciplinary knowledge in the humanities at a retreat of the Conference of Administrative Officers, American Council of Learned Societies, Salt Lake City, 1 November 2007. I hope that his remarks can be published soon, as they represent an important intellectual challenge to those of us who engage in interdisciplinary forms of study.

to collaboration with non-political science area-studies scholars, but I don't know enough about this to comment on it one way or the other. But I worry very, very much that the kind of issue-oriented, empirical, *and* theoretical approaches that all of you bring to the study of the German-speaking lands is increasingly being lost to the larger world of German Studies. And that is one reason why I welcome the closer collaboration between the GSA and the newly founded IASGP, and I hope that all of you come to San Diego to listen to Charlie Jeffery's speech and to attend all the political science sessions *and* lots of others as well.

And then there is the "Söder question." How will our colleagues in Central Europe respond to initiatives like those proposed by the MLA? Will they respond at all, or simply regard it as another example of unfathomable, flaky American trendiness and lack of real intellectual depth or *Gründlichkeit*? Will the rise of a cultural-studies approach to German Studies widen and deepen the transatlantic divide? Will the embrace of "transcultural understanding" actually lead to less of it? Or should we Americans really care about what the Germans think of what we're doing? That seems like a really silly question when we're talking here about cross-cultural communication and bridging transatlantic divides, but I'll raise it anyway.

3) Finally, there might be a third and more modest—but ultimately more fruitful—future for German Studies in North America *and* for effective transatlantic collaboration in an age of transnationalism. It is so trite that I'm almost embarrassed to mention it: except for the fact that so many Germans *and* Americans (and Britons as well?) seem to have forgotten it. As you will have noted, this afternoon I have questioned the efficacy of exchange programs and criticized many Germans for rather uncritically accepting ancient clichés, simplifications, and stereotypes about the United States. I have also pretty clearly indicated my empathy for Hans-Peter Söder's critique of American scholarship about Germany.

One of my three or four favorite historians was not a German or American historian of Germany, but a British historian of France, and that was the late Richard Cobb. I suspect that most of us in this room have read his great essay "A Second Identity," which, after all these years, still represents an invaluable guide to all of us who are engaged in the business of learning about other cultures.¹⁵ As Cobb himself testified, assuming a second cultural identity is not an easy process, and it will always be incomplete and in some ways artificial. Or to cite another great British scholar, R. G. Collingwood, getting into the brains of people who aren't like us and who are in any case usually dead isn't very easy. But it seems to me—and this is the heart of Söder's critique, I think, and it cuts both ways—that we should stop theorizing and, like that ultimately transnational corporation Nike would enjoin us, "just do it." I am not really suggesting that German exchange scholars in the US become blindly philo-American, or that people like me can become, or try to become, just like Germans or Austrians or Swiss. Nor am I even faintly suggesting that we abandon the critical apparatus that we bring to bear when looking

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¹⁵ Richard Cobb, *A Second Identity: Essays on France and French History* (Oxford, 1969).
at the Other and living with the reality of cultural difference. But we need to do a whole lot more to understand and empathize with that Other *on its own terms*. As my earlier anecdotes and statistics suggest, we are not doing enough of this. And if we do not, then it seems to me that the future of German Studies is bleak.

So how do we get from here to there? This is not the time or place to come up with solutions, but we could certainly begin, I think, by rethinking the structure and the goals of our academic and cultural exchange programs, by establishing joint committees of Germans and Americans (and Britons for that matter) to reflect on the Atlantic divide and come up with practicable solutions, and also to accept the fact that we are separate, we are different, and that no human solution to any problem is perfect. So the future of German Studies—like the future of transatlantic cooperation—will continue to be messy and imperfect, but I hope it will be better than it currently is. And I hope that both the IASGP and the GSA can be critically involved in shaping that future.

Charlie Jeffery University of Edinburgh

What I want to do this lunchtime is offer some thoughts on the extent of change in German policies on European integration since 1990. Those policies certainly ought to have changed. Since 1990 Germany has faced vastly different conditions both internally and in its wider European and global settings. One might expect such changed conditions to lead German policymakers to act differently, to question older commitments, to reconsider the goals and means of policy.

That certainly was the expectation in a wave of analysis in the early to mid-1990s, which painted a perhaps disturbing picture: Germany no longer the *Musterknabe* of European integration, selflessly committed to multilateral cooperation; a Germany that instead would act unilaterally, use force or at least the threat of force—even nuclear weapons—as a tool of policy; a Germany of *Schaukelpolitik*, playing off east and west against each other, a Germany that would become "normalized" by casting off the powerful historical legacies which had embedded its commitment to European integration; a Germany that even, as one commentator darkly put it, would become "British" in its external relations. Heaven forbid.

Well, none of that came to pass, and those pessimistic forecasts, largely driven by international relations theory, were convincingly rebutted in empirical work in the mid-90s which found, by contrast, a high degree of continuity in the goals and means of German policy before and after unification. But what about now, more than fifteen years after unification? Is the postwar German vocation of European cooperation, of subsuming national interest into a wider European project still intact?

To sum up my argument with a German equivocation: Jein.

Germany takes, compared with ten years ago, a sharper edge into European negotiations. It has become much more selfish in its approach to European cooperation, it is now one of the more protectionist member states of the European Union, it is much more focused on calculating cost and benefit and acting accordingly, it is much more conditional, fickle even, in its relationships with other member states, it is much less likely to support further-reaching integration, and much more likely to argue that the nation-state is a better framework for tackling policy problems than the EU, it is much more likely to use language of the nation, the national interest, *deutsche Interessen*, to express German goals.

But at the same time there is also a persistence, one now over fifty years old, of conceptions of how to organize European integration—broadly as a federal parliamentary democracy—which tempers, frames and constrains the harder elbows that Germany is now deploying in Europe.

In this talk I want to offer a perspective which ranges across the last half century as a way of pinpointing better just what has changed in Germany's European

^{*} Luncheon address, German Studies Association, San Diego, 6 October 2007.

vocation, and what that change means. It is a story in three acts, from Adenauer to Merkel via Kohl, and one whose twists reflect a changing relationship between German domestic politics and the institutions of European integration.

Before I launch into that account, though, let me pay a tribute. What I have to say draws deeply on generations of outstanding German scholarship on the relationship of Germany and Europe. But it draws as much, perhaps more, on work done in the US by scholars like Peter Katzenstein, Andi Markovits, Jeff Anderson, Jim Sperling, Bev Crawford, and others, and in the UK by Emil Kirchner, Simon Bulmer and especially, and indefatigably, Willie Paterson.

In this field of the study of German politics as in many others knowledge and understanding of Germany has been pushed on by the cross-fertilization of German scholarship with the active communities of political scientists working on Germany in the US and the UK, and has been challenged, tested and, I think, improved by the different perspective that comes from being outside Germany. Political scientists working outside Germany on Germany bring real added value.

But it is becoming more difficult to sustain that capacity for added value as political science disciplinary orthodoxy increasingly downplays the value of country specialism. We think that orthodoxy is wrong-headed, we being the British and US groups of political scientists who work on Germany. We think it is especially wrong-headed given the state of the German political system, in which ageing, pre-1990 structures are creaking to accommodate the new cleavages and tensions that have accumulated since 1990. Arguably this is the most important time since the 1940s and 1950s to be studying German politics.

So what we have done is form an International Association for the Study of German Politics which brings together around 250 political scientists as a new transatlantic forum with a bigger reach than our old US-only and UK-only forums, which will provide a more robust platform for the engagement of German and non-German scholarship, and which will help underpin the political science presence here at GSA.

We are marking the launch of that International Association with a reception this evening at 6pm in the Rose Garden here at the Town and Country Club. Drinks are kindly offered (that is, I should say, free) by the publishers of the Association's journal, *German Politics*, Taylor and Francis. I hope to see you there and hope that a good number of you will want to support the Association and become members.

Commercial break over, let's turn now to the evolution and explanation of Germany's relationship with European integration. I see in that evolution three distinct phases which mirror some of the turbulences of postwar European politics and which mark important shifts in the interface of domestic and European politics in Germany:

- 1. From the foundation of the West German state in 1949 through to 1969
- 2. From 1969 through German unification in 1990 to the end of the Kohl era in 1998
- 3. The period since 1998

PHASE ONE 1949–1969: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AS EXISTENTIAL PROJECT

Turning to that first phase, 1949–69, the domestic context which shaped West Germany's initial engagement with the emerging institutions of European integration was, for obvious enough reasons, a difficult one. West Germany was a state weighed down by at least three sets of foundational insecurities:

- The first was about the capacity of West Germany to develop peaceful and productive relations with its (western) neighbors, especially France. But doing so was a precondition both for economic reconstruction through trade and for the rehabilitation of West Germany as a reliable and desirable international partner.
- The second was about the new security threat from the east which had emerged with the onset of the Cold War, now amplified by the threat of atomic war.
- The third was about the commitment of West Germans to democracy which, as the classic study of political culture by Almond and Verba showed, was by no means secure.

In sum, West Germany was a democratic state without convinced democrats, looking to rebuild war-soured relationships with its neighbors on which its economic renewal depended, and faced by a new quality of security threat. It is no exaggeration to term these a set of existential questions. It was against that background that the foundational understanding of European integration was established in West Germany. It melded two strands of thinking. Let me over-personify them as a convenient shorthand on Konrad Adenauer and Walter Hallstein.

Adenauer's concern was to position the new state to best effect internationally to neutralize its insecurities. At its core was the relationship with France, whose agreement was a precondition for economic cooperation which would spark the growth of the West German economy and build confidence in West Germany as an international partner. Economic strength and international rehabilitation were in turn prerequisites for West Germany's acceptance into the European and transatlantic alliance structures which offered a measure of security to West Germany in the Cold War.

This interconnection of interests underpinned Adenauer's *Westpolitik*. It established a pattern of bargaining in European negotiations in which two factors were especially important:

- First, providing reassurance for France by "anchoring" West German power in multilateral frameworks
- And second, establishing bargains not necessarily to direct West German advantage (and often at substantial West German cost) which strengthened frameworks of multilateral cooperation (e.g. the Common Agricultural Policy established in 1958 which benefited in particular France to West

Germany's disproportionate cost).

This *Westpolitik* was extraordinarily successful. The opening up of trade through European integration was one of the foundations of the West German economic "miracle" of the 1950s. By 1958 the successor to what in 1945 had been a pariah state was now rehabilitated as a core member of all the new institutions of European and transatlantic cooperation, and worked especially closely with the habitual enemy of France. And by 1961 at the latest—when the US rallied support for West Germany during the Berlin Wall crisis—it was clear that *Westpolitik* provided the security guarantees West Germany needed.

At the same time a more diffuse sense of allegiance to the constitutional form of the West German state emerged. This growth in allegiance was certainly kick-started by, and was initially over-dependent on, economic success. But over time what Almond and Verba called "the underlying set of political attitudes" that would sustain democracy in times of economic difficulty became embedded. The proof came with the mid-1960s recession—the first downturn since 1949—which was followed by a short-lived surge in support for the far-right. Neither lasted, and there was no neo-Nazi revival in the much deeper recessions of the 1970s. By then the questions posed of West German democracy were not about its superficiality or vulnerability, but about the quality and scope of the 'post-material' democracy that new political movements—students, pacifists, ecologists, feminists—demanded.

These successes in both external relationships and internal democratic stabilization were intimately associated with European integration. By externalizing its foundational insecurities into European cooperation the West German state succeeded spectacularly in confounding them. The effect was to embed a consensus among policy-makers and broadly the public as well that European integration was a necessary foundation of the West German state. European integration became less the instrumental calculation of Adenauerian statecraft and increasingly a *Staatsräson*, as Anderson and Goodman put it, something "embedded in the very definition of state interests and strategies." European and national interest became elided; the "closer union" envisaged by the Rome Treaty became, as commentators variously described it, an "instinctive" commitment, a "reflex", a strand in the "genetic code" of German policy-makers.

The second part of the foundational understanding of European integration was most closely associated with Walther Hallstein, Adenauer's state secretary for foreign affairs and later the first President of the European Commission. If the direction and success of Adenauer's policies entrenched the commitment to ever closer union, Hallstein added the vision of how that union should be organized.

That vision saw federal principles of government as a means of transcending nationalism and war through international cooperation. It connected to some of the idealistic theories of federalism which were first floated amid the international tensions of the interwar years and then renewed in the wartime resistance. Hallstein's vision was to establish institutions of government at the European level which replicated the institutional division of powers and representative qualities of national constitutional democracy, and which created in the relationship of the two levels of constitutional democracy a body with the characteristics of a federation. It was put into practice in the early institutions of European integration which, even though their scope was modest, were described by Hallstein in the terminology of federal parliamentary democracy and presented as prototypes of a future European federation.

PHASE TWO 1969–98—FEDERATION WITH A GERMAN FACE

To summaries: the foundational phase of Germany's relationship with European integration produced both a commitment to ever closer European union as a German national interest and a commitment to constitutionalizing that union as a federal democracy.

Those commitments were extended and flourished in the middle one of my three phases. Starting with the election of the social-liberal coalition under Willy Brandt this phase saw a threefold shift in domestic and European context and the interface between them:

- First, West Germany was clearly no longer a state facing existential concerns, but one seen increasingly as a "model". This was a state increasingly confident in itself and enjoying the confidence of others.
- Second, the resignation of the obstructionist French President Charles de Gaulle in 1969 opened up a new dynamism in European integration, with three new member states including the UK joining the then EEC in 1973, and a range of new integration initiatives including in 1979 the first direct elections to the European Parliament.
- Third, the signal achievement of the Brandt government was its *Ostpolitik*. Though popular at home the *Ostpolitik* raised concerns elsewhere, especially in France, where there were fears that opening to the east might question postwar commitments in the west and the Franco-German relationship that stood at their core.

This constellation of domestic and European developments set the parameters for a new phase in the commitment of German policy-makers to European integration which reached its apogee under Helmut Kohl. It took forward both the reflexive commitment to ever-closer union which resulted from the elision of national interests with European integration, and the commitment to democratize the institutions of European integration associated with Hallstein.

These legacies placed Germany at the heart of the new momentum of the 1970s in ways which replicated earlier patterns: integrationist measures were proposed as a means of reassuring France by confirming the 'anchorage' of Germany in multilateral institutions. Especially important here were proposals on European monetary cooperation which Brandt, working closely with the French President Pompidou, endorsed in 1970 as a demonstrative commitment to established *Westpolitik* alongside the new *Ostpolitik*. Later initiatives—the exchange rate mechanism for managing currency fluctuations of 1979 and the agreement to proceed to European

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Economic and Monetary Union in 1991—also bore the imprint of Franco-German joint leadership with a subtext of harnessing German power.

A second concern was to underpin new multilateral initiatives by offering "side-payments" for measures whose costs would fall disproportionately to West Germany as the Community's main financial contributor. This applied for example to the establishment of a European cohesion policy in the 1970s as a sop to the UK and its extension in the course of the Mediterranean enlargements in the 1980s.

A third concern was to strengthen the democratic institutions of the Community—that is, above all, the European Parliament—as a necessary step in legitimizing the integration process as its scope grew, with German support central to the introduction of direct elections to the Parliament from 1979 and for the widening of its powers in the 1980s and 1990s. More generally the intensive debate we have been having more recently on a European constitution has its origins in the German commitment under Kohl to flank the move to Economic and Monetary Union with balancing moves to closer political union to bring democratic accountability to closer economic cooperation.

In addition to these continuities the new phase added a further component: that new-found confidence in the West German "model". This opened up scope for what Willie Paterson, Simon Bulmer and I called "institutional export": the supply of German institutional models for Europe. These included the domestic federal experience of multi-level parliamentary democracy, now with parallels in the strengthened European Parliament, and the framework for German monetary stability policed with unrivalled success by the Bundesbank which informed the goals and instruments of European monetary cooperation up to and including the current framework for managing the EU's single currency.

Other examples were the "export" of industrial standards in the Single Market program, opening up EU-level decision-making to regional actors, and at a more fundamental level a commitment to the reproduction of the central principles of German constitutional democracy at the European level, something reflected both in the phrasing of the Basic Law on transfers of powers to the EU and in the judgments of the Federal Constitutional Court on the compatibility of European integration with the Basic Law.

The net result was a growing congruence of European with German institutional structures. There was not simply a reaffirmation in this era of the belief that German and European interests were identical, there was also a growing institutional similarity which reflected a deep, systemic self-confidence in the German state. In our book on *Germany's European Diplomacy* we argued that this was a particularly advantageous situation for Germany, an expression of an extraordinarily far-reaching yet 'soft' power.

PHASE THREE 1998-: GERMANY'S NEW FEDERALISM

Looking back at that book now—written in 2000—I think we were right, but we weren't right for very long. Just as we published it the goalposts began to shift. The interface of domestic and European politics moved from one of far-reaching

congruence to one with an increasingly ragged edge. I recognize it is not really a terminology I should use in this part of the US, but Willie and I described this shift as a grinding of tectonic plates.

The German plate shifted as the longer term, domestic implications of German unification became clear; and the EU plate shifted as the longer term implications for Germany of decisions taken in for the EU in the early 1990s became clear.

Domestically, confidence in the German political system has been shaken as new distributional conflicts have slowed down decision-making, producing concerns about inertia and gridlock. Germany has become for those reasons more introspective, more self-referenced. But it has also externalized some of that introspection by projecting its internal distributional conflicts into the EU. There is a new tendency to assert and protect narrow regional interests. There are growing concerns about the sustainability of German contributions to the EU budget. Both are confirmed in a more Germany-focused, less integrationist public opinion.

And there are three new problems at the European level.

- The first is about monetary union, that institutional design intended to impose German-style monetary rigor on the more profligate members of the Union. That design has now become an unwelcome, one-size-fits-all constraint on Germany's fiscal policy, limiting its scope to respond to the domestic consequences of unification.
- 2. Second, EU-led liberalization of markets has now moved beyond areas of German strength, such as manufacturing, to areas of relative weakness, such as services, and to challenge long-standing practices of state subsidy to business. Liberalization increasingly hurts.
- 3. Third, the enlargement of the EU to the east has exposed the high level of labor costs in Germany, with a consequent export of jobs to the east and tougher cross-border competition especially in services. Enlargement also makes parts of the EU policy portfolio like agriculture and cohesion policy, for which Germany has been the paymaster, much more expensive. Domestic budgetary constraints and EU-level obligations collide here in a bitter resource "crunch".

In other words, the problematic consequences of unification are now recognized to be more intractable than they were in the initial aftermath of unification. And the EU now, and in an unexpectedly encompassing way, acts more as a difficult constraint on Germany than as the venue for German soft power that it was in the 1980s and 1990s.

There are clear consequences for German EU policy. There is now a new sense of conditionality in German negotiating stances, a new determination to resist unwelcome EU level regulation, to limit German budget contributions, to protect German economic interests, to risk long-standing alliances—even that with the French—for short term interests, to use problems at the EU level as tools for mobilizing domestic public opinion, in short to prioritize the national over the European. The national and the European interest are no longer instinctively elided. All of this has been evident in German contributions to the European constitutional debate since 2000. That debate, prompted by a need to streamline the organization of the union now it has 27 not 15 members, has seen a number of phases, under different German governments, and now appears to be entering the final straight with the current negotiations on the EU Reform Treaty.

What has been remarkable in that debate is how consensual the positions represented by German actors have been, in federal and regional government, on the left and on the right, under Schröder and under Merkel. Let me summarize briefly:

- 1. First, there has been an unprecedented emphasis on the nation-state, its "irreplaceability", on the need to protect national diversity. Diversity is important because nation-states are the primary bearers of social identity and political legitimacy. It is also important because they act as laboratories for competing ideas which foster innovation
- 2. That links to a second point: the scope of European integration is too loosely defined, leaving scope for European "competence creep" which cuts across and limits national diversity and innovation.
- 3. Third, the reach of European competence needs to be specified more precisely and controlled more rigorously to prevent further competence creep.
- 4. And fourth, where necessary, where European competence is no longer relevant to contemporary problems, it should be returned to the nationstate, renationalized, especially in those expensive areas like agriculture and cohesion policy where Germany stumps up most of the cash.

I put all that starkly but I don't think unfairly. I think it adds up to a sea change for German policy. The emphasis on the nation-state, the depiction of the distribution of competences between the EU and Germany as a zero-sum game which needs to be fixed and even adjusted in favor of the nation-state, is a qualitatively different understanding of the desirable scope of European integration. Ever closer union is quite simply off the agenda. Adenauer's legacy appears exhausted.

Hallstein's, though, does not. That is, where policy problems, even in this more limited vision of union, can best be achieved by EU-level action, then they still need, or need all the more, to be exercised under conventional rules of parliamentary democracy. Though German contributions to the constitutional debate were on the one hand about limiting the union, they also advocated a strengthening of the democratic credentials of the union, boosting the European Parliament's powers, increasing the meaning to voters of European Parliament elections, restricting the role of the member states in EU-level decisions.

This commitment on the one hand to demarcating member state from EU competence, and on the other to strengthening the direct democratic authority of the EU and limiting the role of the member state in EU decisions is intriguing. The former is a striking departure from Adenauer and the latter is a striking endorsement of Hallstein's commitment to European federation. That part at least of the postwar European vocation remains.

But perhaps there is more to read into these changes. Let me do so, in conclusion, by referring to a distinction made my Simon Bulmer and Willie Paterson to describe Adenauer era commitments. They distinguished between the political importance of European integration for West Germany as an arena of multilateral *cooperation* and its economic importance as an arena of market *competition*. They said: "Without European integration as a political arena of cooperation West German economic performance would have been perceived as a threat." That is a subtle account of how German power needed to be harnessed to secure the consent of others for its reconstruction.

What we see now is in some respects the reverse, with a more protectionist Germany seeking to limit the scope of market competition by injecting a new competitiveness—that is the emphasis on national interest—into the political arena of European integration.

There is now a much stronger notion of using Europe for specific national ends which is replacing the notion that national and European ends were one and the same. There is now a much stronger sense of maximizing narrowly national advantage in a competition of national interests. And what's striking is nobody much minds.

There no longer need to be subtle trade-offs and mechanisms for harnessing German power, there no longer needs to be the consent of others for Germany to pursue its national interest. That appears to me to be a definitive statement of Germany's rehabilitation as a reliable and trusted international partner. It may have taken fifty years but that part at least of Adenauer's vision is now complete.

Why?*

Peter Gay

1.

The study of causes lies at the heart of scholarship. I grant that the sheer digging up of facts has its place, or the making of patterns from the facts discovered has a vital role for the scholar. But beyond this, the explication of cause remains the most daring venture in historical investigation. Typically any textbook offering an analysis of the historian's craft will tell you that the historian's ultimate triumph is to ascertain the causes of things, the reasons why. Thus E. H. Carr writes in his popular primer, *What is History*?, that History is "the study of causes," and so would whatever other textbook I could have cited. To the degree that scholarship has any fundamental purpose, the most momentous one is to find out why something happened. I want to quote the great Dutch abstract painter Piet Mondrian to show you that one need not be a professional scholar to find that this search for the answer to Why often acquires an overpowering force: "There is a cause for everything," Mondrian wrote, "but we do not always know it! To know, to understand, is happiness." That is a strong proclamation to make, but it is not absurd.

Why, then? Why did Goethe write about the short life of young Werther, and why did this epistolary novel matter to his immediate public and to the course of German literature? Why did Arnold Boecklin paint the "Toteninsel" and why do students of German art need to inquire into its impetus on German painting? Or why did Arnold Schoenberg's Second Quartet arouse such controversy? The kinds of answers we expect will largely be determined by the kinds of questions we ask. We may be led to investigate the motives, the intentions, of historical actors, or be driven to look into the history of styles, or perhaps both. We can be sure that reliable answers will nearly always be more complicated than a single schematic attitude toward causation would allow. A powerful motive may remain unrealized, or an unplanned set of pressures may emerge in its stead. Intended consequences may emerge as the true cause of events—the whole decades-long debate over the origins of the capitalist spirit, ever since Max Weber raised it more than a century ago, has centered on precisely this issue.

2.

A helpful first step will be for me to chart the starting place of events. Causes have homes, regions of experience, from which they enter history. There are many sources on the map of the past, but I shall simplify the matter by singling out three of them: culture, craft, and character. Of course, these categories are not like so many countries, with clear and distinct frontiers. They are, much of the time—perhaps nearly all of the time—torn with inner conflicts, and with conflicts introduced from

^{*} Banquet address, German Studies Association, San Diego, 5 October 2007.

a neighboring category. At this point I make my first revisionist point: there is one popular collective term, Zeitgeist, that has in its immensely successful career sown more perplexity than clarity. For there is no way, even in totalitarian regimes, that Zeitgeist ever defines true unanimity; populations will hold a diversity of views. Collective names suppress the individual: Romantics had anti-Romantics to contend with, Modernist art lovers had to deal with conventional anti-Modernists.

The question Why often leads to strange answers. Recently, I had the opportunity of asking Why in writing a lecture I was going to give to a group of Germanisten on the novels of Wolfgang Koeppen. For this audience, as for few, the name evokes postwar, post-1945, Germany. But since he has faded so badly even among students of German literature, I will introduce him briefly. Koeppen, born in 1906, became a prolific writer of reviews—of movies, of plays, of novels, as well as movie scripts—and in 1933 wrote an odd novel of his own, *Eine Unglückliche Liebe*, a rare document in German modernism. But in the same year, as a principled anti-Nazi, he voluntarily emigrated to the Netherlands and did not return until early 1939, because he had run out of ways to make a living in the Hague. He spent most of the war years more or less underground, writing scripts, and after the war returned to fiction. Between 1951 and 1954, he published three novels, not intended as a trilogy but read that way by his astonished readers. His modernist literary techniques owed more to James Joyce than to German authors, though there is a touch of Döblin, too.

These novels were *Tauben im Gras*, *Das Treibhaus*, and *Tod in Rom*. They were quite unmistakably about contemporary Germany, about the time of Adenauer's rule, of the Wirtschaftswunder, and of the reestablishment of a largely sovereign state in 1949, with a new capital, Bonn, a new constitution, and a new federal legislature. The three were aggressive books, I should say angry assaults on a country that was all too eager to forget the disagreeable recent past, willing to give old Nazis a prominent public place in the reborn country, intent on concentrating feverishly on economic progress, on prosperity in disregard of the just past Nazi years, in a word, to repress a myriad of crimes committed in the country's name, or not criticized, by all too many Germans. Koeppen was pitiless. His three novels illustrate in three different ways the silence that prevented the kind of self-examination that critics like Koeppen thought essential.

His first novel of the '50s, *Tauben im Gras*, deals coolly with a single day in Munich, leaping without obvious transitions among several unrelated individuals who will, as in a novel by Dickens, end up more or less intertwined. Nearly all of these postwar Germans fail: a middle-aged journalist fails to write the book he has so long planned, a German family fails to persuade their daughter to give up the black soldier with whom she lives, an American poet giving a lecture on culture that the audience either fails to hear because the microphone is not working or dislikes because it fails to come to terms with the new, more savage culture filled with American visiting troops playing their jazz and competing for white German women. It all seems obvious; Koeppen is describing a coarse, materialistic society, guilt-ridden yet prudently silent. Peter Demetz, the most persuasive Germanist I know, speaks of this novel as a "colorful and desperate mosaic." Still, Koeppen at least thought it necessary to add, to the second printing, a curious foreword in which he clarified what should have been clear all along. "Pigeons in the Grass," he writes, "was written shortly after the currency reform, when the German economic miracle rose in the West, when the first new movie houses, the first new palaces of insurance companies climbed above the ruins....It was the time in which the newly-rich still felt themselves insecure, in which the black market profiteers were looking for investments and those who had been saving their money paid for the war." Instead, Koeppen complained, the reading public was evidently convinced that *Tauben im Gras* put them into the presence of a roman-a-clef in which individuals were being exposed. But Koeppen was not out to quarrel with certain Germans; he was condemning all Germans.

In contrast, Koeppen's next novel, *Das Treibhaus*, has a single hero, a member of the just-reborn legislature, a conscientious citizen who had left Nazi Germany, then returned and found himself in a political situation he finds depressingly disagreeable. It was not, once again, that Koeppen was writing a roman-a-clef. But he was perfectly willing to use his personal history as dramatic material. The hero of *Das Treibhaus* is heavily burdened with his efforts at reform, drowning in papers, reports, legislative initiatives to such an extent that he neglects his young, sensual and needy wife. She, in rebellion, falls victim to an assertive lesbian group and dies young. He is (though the name of his party never appears) in the Social Democratic opposition and is hostile to a proposed rearmament (a debate that was indeed taking place around 1950.) He speaks and he listens, and in the end, in despair of a decent future and his own political impotence, he drowns himself.

Finally, with another twist, *Tod in Rom* makes the struggle of generations its leading theme. There is a single protagonist, like one in *Treibhaus*, except that this one is a blindly loyal Nazi who, despite war and defeat, has not changed his views. Having been a general in the SS, he had managed to escape his country at the end of the war and now works for a Middle Eastern kingdom trading in ammunition and other bellicose hardware. He and members of his family, including one of his sons who is an aspiring priest, meet in Rome for a reunion, and the SS man, elderly but as brutal and egotistical as ever, manages to spend a night with a local prostitute, surprisingly pleasing her erotically with his physical coarseness. But the next day he dies.

3.

This non-trilogy was as spirited and unforgiving a portrait of the new Germany as could be imagined, a portrait that contemporary readers could easily recognize as long as they stood ready to understand what Koeppen was writing about. Koeppen did not preach; he was content with showing his characters, which is to say his countrymen, at work and at play. Since we no longer live in those early days of post-Nazi Germany, these novels now demand a good deal of interpretation. Thus, to give only one example, the discussion about rearmament in the Bundestag in *Das Treibhaus* was, as I have already suggested, a quite realistic concern of German legislators in the early 1950s. But there was for me, after I had completed my reading, a far more mysterious matter. Where were the Jews?

About half of Germany's Jews, some 250,000 of them, had been able to flee their fatherland, and the other half had been massacred. What of them? Why did Koeppen resolutely disregard them? Was he not a realist with a long list of German transgressions and transgressors? True, there is, in *Tod in Rom*, a particularly ugly scene in which the old SS general shoots a woman to death to obey his beloved Führer, simply because she is a Jew. But that appears as an extravagant gesture by an unreconstructed Nazi. What of the other Germans? Why did Koeppen erase the Jews from his distinctly contemporary fiction? Why?

It took me a while reading and rereading Koeppen to come to my answer. He was writing about Germany in the early 1950s. And this was the age of the great silence. What did you do in the war, daddy?, was a question that rarely got an answer in the early years of the Bundesrepublik. It was not until the early 1970s, stirred up among other reminders by American television movies, that Germans remembered and began to talk about Jews and themselves. That was the answer to Why? Realistically enough, Koeppen was in the early 1950s mirroring the general conspiracy of silence as far as Jews were concerned.

4.

Now, the most general, most comprehensive category of cause is *culture*, which globally embraces the external forces that surround and leave their mark on individuals and groups. Obviously all too many cultural causes require no debate. You will not be astonished to learn that Günter Grass located most of his fictions in or near Danzig—it was, after all, his home town. And in this regard, Grass' *Blechtrommel* is much like James Joyce's *Ulysses*. Much of what we learn in our causal inquiries is of this obvious sort, though, however banal, they deserve attention, for they may matter.

But, of course, far from every cultural cause is quite so easy to spot. I have made this point before: culture almost never speaks with one voice. And its internal conflicts are often the most interesting puzzles demanding to be solved.

Once again, I can stay with Grass for my point. The excited-I am tempted to call it the hysterical—controversy that exploded a year ago about Grass' confession that as a young man, he had briefly belonged to the Waffen-SS, is a good instance of cultural causes in conflict. Most of you will recall the event. Early in August 2006, Grass, about to publish an autobiography, acknowledged to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Germany's most prestigious conservative newspaper, that in the spring of 1945, when the war was already definitely lost for Nazi Germany, he had been drafted into the Waffen-SS, and had kept this episode secret all his life—for some 62 years. The public response was electric, overwhelming. There were critics like Joachim Fest of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, who maintained that he would certainly not buy a used car from Günter Grass. There was Lech Walesa, that Polish rebel, whom Grass had supported from the outset, who proposed that Grass resign from the honorary citizenship that Danzig had awarded him. Others thought that Grass ought to return the Nobel Prize for Literature he had been awarded in 1999. And Charlotte Knobloch, who heads Germany's Jewish population, said contemptuously that the revelation of his hidden career, however limited, reduced all his many political pronouncement, all of them on the Left, to "absurdities."

Newspapers and newsmagazines, radio and television programs echoed this attack of collective indignation, and a deep need to condemn the famous writer's youthful crime (as most called it), and, perhaps even more so, his long silence. He of all Germans, that self-appointed scold who had publicly lived off his celebrated moral superiority, was the wrong person to have acted this way and then concealed it. Nor did this wave of self-righteousness remain confined to the German-speaking territory. In New York, to give but a single foreign example, the *New York Sun*, a conservative daily recently founded as a reply to the *New York Times*, gave a writer named Daniel Johnson two successive days and ample space for a scathing open letter to Grass, which denounced him as a traitor to his Germany, as a subtle deceiver who, as member in the Waffen-SS, had almost set forth to save the life of his beloved Fuehrer. Johnson was no less than apoplectic: "You have lived and will die a fraud, a coward, and a hypocrite. One day you may be forgotten, but you will never be forgiven."

Fortunately, culture was by no means of one mind in this angry quarrel. The noisiness and vehemence of Grass' detractors threatened to drown out another. though far smaller, audience. Perhaps the most prominent defender of Grass' youthful action and his lifelong silence was Ralph Giordano, a respected Jewish journalist who had lived through the war in hiding, who said, reasonably enough, that in 1945 Grass was still more or less a kid, and besides, what alternative did he have? Yet the passages published within a few weeks made it plain, as the boom in Grass denunciations collapsed almost as rapidly as it had been blown up, that these minority voices had a respectable cohort on their side. I should call it the voice of realism, though I must plead guilty that I am a member of this group; hence you are, of course, entitled to question my perhaps somewhat complacent self-appraisal. What distinguished the culture of realism was two qualities: an unwillingness to be seduced by the cheap emotion of indignation, and a willingness to consider a few facts. Briefly, these facts included, (1) the age of the perpetrator (we know that Grass was 17 at the time he was drafted, and after a couple of months of desperate retreat on the Eastern front, he was wounded, captured, and spent a brief time in the United States as a prisoner of war); (2) that the Waffen-SS was not yet notorious for its atrocities in the East; (3) that Grass had volunteered for the Navy (notably its submarine branch) and been turned down; (4) that the young recruit was not to learn of the crimes against humanity for which Hitler's regime would become notorious (his father had joined the Nazi party in 1936, and there were few incentives to find alternate ideals in his family or his local environment); (5) that there was one explanation, a psychological one, that seemed to me convincing (and I wrote my Op-Ed piece for the New York Times before I had a chance to read in Grass' autobiography) and cover the list of causes one could find sufficient: he was ashamed of this adolescent episode and could not bring himself to go public with it

Prominent among the charges against Grass was the observation that the curious timing of his confession was easy to explain: he was about to publish his 50

autobiography and wanted some publicity—what more useful than such a startling confession? To consider this indictment is to move into the second category of historical causation, craft. Only someone unacquainted with the making and selling of books in Germany will make such an accusation. Grass, Germany's most celebrated writer, was about to go public with his life. I will grant you that publishing is an odd business, and it is not impossible that an editor might have thought of launching Grass' autobiography by prefacing it with a sensational revelation. But anyone, I think, will agree is that Grass needed no parades, certainly not one that would rouse opposition. He had a bestseller on his hands simply by having the world know—through advertisements, through reviews, through the inescapable radio and television interviews—that a new Grass was on the way.

5.

Yet, as I said at the beginning, we have still another category, character. Why publish this youthful sin, or crime? Why publish it in the summer of 2006? If, sheer appetite for self-promotion does not fit, what else may serve as a motive? In short, once again, Why?

Character traits, whether played out in someone's conscious or unconscious are no doubt the trickiest source of motivation. If you are, as I am, a partisan of Sigmund Freud's view of the human animal, this commitment, I must insist, does not automatically solve the conundrum of how to resolve the dilemmas produced by human nature as it encounters life. The first question that scholars are likely to ask is whether the psychoanalytic view is worth accepting as a premise from which to work. I think it is, but demonstrating it would require far more time than I have tonight. Let me only say that for my money, we should include unconscious urges and inhibitions among our armamentarium. More than other psychological foundations, I believe it to be central to causal investigations. It soundly belongs to our category of character.

But, psychoanalysis or not, the initial difficulty with Warum emerging as a necessary category of cause is the question, Do we know enough? When I wrote my op-ed piece on Grass the SS man, I left no doubt that I was insufficiently informed precisely on this point. I acknowledged that I had never met Grass, which is to say at the very least, that I was not Grass' psychoanalyst. Hence I had to conjecture, basing myself on interviews with him, or whatever autobiographical revelations he included in his writings, and a fair acquaintance with Grass' fiction, and his graphic art. And putting it all together, I came to my conclusion. I am not asking you to judge my amateurish verdict on faith; It was no doubt oversimplified, though it made sense to me. And I have little confidence that we are likely ever to gather enough information to draw a really adequate psychological portrait of Grass, and thus solve the riddles that certain episodes in his life have raised.

For all the difficulties attending Grass' action and inaction, it is a given that the historian must try to deal with them. It is from this state of mind that any ethical judgment must arise. Why did Grass keep mum about this youthful exploit for so many years? Why did he break his discretion just when he did? It is on this point that my answer to Why was fairly simple, probably too simple: Grass had remained

silent for so long, because he was ashamed, and that he kept postponing his selfrevelation until writing his autobiography pushed the issue to the foreground. Germans who lived through the 30s and 40s had much to be ashamed of, and Grass was just old enough to belong at least marginally to this sizable population. I am speaking here largely about his conscious awareness what he had become involved with, and he found no way out from this conundrum. But in 2006 he was in his late seventies, and the risk of some biographer discovering this none-so-secret secret troubled him greatly. Grass the SS-man might have been discovered from an official variety of sources, both American and German, and thus he felt forced to anticipate the research of others.

This is an overly simple model of how the scholar of Grass, whether historian or Germanist, might proceed in exploring the mysteries of why. Such detective work is not easy, and there has been much revisionism precisely because such a venture is so demanding. But Günter Grass himself was ready to complicate the problem of Grass, the uncontrolled bomb. I am going to close with this. If there should ever be a psychoanalytic scholar who takes up Grass as his subject, I have in my possession a porcelain plaque that would serve as important evidence. It is Grass at his most reasonable. It shows one of his drawings, a snail, and above it there is a caption written in his unmistakable handwriting. It says, "Progress is a snail"—"Der Fortschritt ist eine Schnecke."

In Memoriam

[We are saddened to learn of the recent deaths of two very distinguished scholars in German Studies, Professors Daphne Berdahl and Gerald D. Feldman. Tributes to Professors Berdahl and Feldman will appear in the next issue of this newsletter.]

Jamie Bishop

Dear Friends,

Jamie Bishop was our friend and colleague. He died tragically on Monday, April 16th while teaching German at Virginia Tech. He leaves behind a grieving family that faces financial challenges as they mourn. Many of you have offered support and condolences to his widow, Stefanie Hofer. We are grateful for this outpouring and in response we, his colleagues and friends, have created the "Bishop-Hofer Support Fund" to offer you a way to support Steffi and her family at this difficult time. To make contribution, please make out a check to:

The Bishop-Hofer Support Fund

And send it to: The Bishop-Hofer Support Fund c/o Wachovia Bank Blacksburg Financial Center 200 North Main Street VA7044 Blacksburg, VA 24060

Please feel free to pass this information to anyone you believe is interested in helping with this effort.

Raul Hilberg

Raul Hilberg, pioneering and preeminent historian of the Holocaust, passed away in Williston, Vermont on 4 August 2007. Author of the seminal history of the Holocaust, *The Destruction of the European Jews*, Hilberg was Professor of Political Science at the University of Vermont from 1956 until his retirement in 1991.

Born in Vienna, Raul Hilberg and his family were forced to emigrate from Austria in 1939 via Cuba to the United States. He attended Lincoln High School in Brooklyn and Brooklyn College, and served in the U.S. Army in Europe during World War II. As a young soldier, he first came into contact with some of the enormous store of Nazi records that would expose the crimes of the Third Reich, in particular the mass murder of the Jews of Europe. He returned to the United States to complete his undergraduate studies at Brooklyn College, and went on to earn his M.A. and then his Ph.D. in political science at Columbia University in 1955.

With an interest in the history and functioning of bureaucracies and specifically the role of the German bureaucracy in perpetrating genocide against the Jews, Hilberg wrote his doctoral dissertation under the direction of Franz Neumann. After brief tenures at Hunter College and with the U.S. government's War Documentation Project in Alexandria, Virginia, where he worked on captured German documents, he joined the political science department at the University of Vermont in 1956.

His Columbia dissertation on the Holocaust initially seemed destined for the professional and scholarly dead-end that Franz Neumann had warned him about when Hilberg was still a graduate student. With little interest in the subject among academicians, publishers, and the general public, it was rejected by numerous publishers before it finally appeared in print in 1961. *The Destruction of the European Jews* was the first comprehensive history of the Holocaust, and the most exhaustive examination to date of the trove of captured Nazi documents that became available during the decade of the 1950s. In depth and in scope, Hilberg's book far surpassed the few works that existed on the subject at the time, such as Gerald Reitlinger's *The Final Solution*. In its focus on the perpetrators of the genocide, Hilberg meticulously reconstructed and analyzed every cog in their bloated bureaucratic machinery as it implemented a policy of systematic mass murder of the Jews in Europe. His study soon became the standard work on the history of the Holocaust in Europe, a distinction it has retained in its revised and much expanded form to this day.

Along with the ever-increasing availability of massive amounts of Nazi documentation and the consequent explosion of interest by the 1970s in the history of Nazi Germany, Hilberg's path-breaking work helped to spawn a generation of historians and other scholars of the Holocaust. A by-product of this was the emergence of an interdisciplinary field of study that has become as varied today as it is large.

Professor Hilberg continued to infuse his intelligence, his unrivaled familiarity with the sources, and his penetrating analysis into the debates that inevitably accompanied this growth. At international symposia and public lectures, in a number of additional books, and in other academic, scholarly, and media settings, he made

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ongoing contributions to the field that he had initially done so much to engender. His book Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders: The Jewish Catastrophe, 1933–1945, published in 1992, was an effort to incorporate the victims of, and bystanders to, the crimes of Nazi Germany into his previous analytical focus on the perpetrators, a point of criticism that his standard work had long endured. His insightful and revealing Sources of Holocaust Research: An Analysis, which appeared in 2001, offers an analysis of the sources he had mastered for half a century as a distinct subject of inquiry. In discussing those sources, Hilberg reasoned that "They are not identical to the subject matter. They have their own history and qualities, which are different from the actions they depict and which require a separate approach." Of course, the third edition of his three-volume The Destruction of the European Jews, published by Yale University Press in 2003, incorporates additional material from the huge store of German records captured by the Soviet Union in World War II and made available to western scholars only after its collapse. And his three commentaries in Claude Lanzmann's Shoah provided some of the necessary historical framework for this epic nine-hour documentary. Other examples of Raul Hilberg's essential contributions to the field over almost five decades are too numerous to mention here.

Holocaust Studies and the larger academic profession have lost a colleague and friend of immense stature and scholarly integrity, personal warmth and generosity, a person Herman Wouk once described as "the humblest great man that I have known."

Francis R. Nicosia Saint Michael's College Carolyn and Leonard Miller Center for Holocaust Studies at the University of Vermont, Interim Director

Otto Pflanze

Otto Paul Pflanze, an internationally recognized historian of nineteenth-century Germany and biographer of Bismarck, died on March 3, 2007, at the age of 88 in Bloomington, Indiana. Pflanze was born in Maryville, Tennessee, where he received an undergraduate degree in history from Maryville College. After earning a Master's Degree from Yale University, he interrupted his graduate training in 1942 to serve as First Lieutenant in the Air Corps of the US Army until 1946. Following the war, Pflanze resumed graduate work at Yale under the tutelage of Hajo Holborn, who had himself fled Nazi Germany with his Jewish wife. While still a graduate student at Yale, Pflanze worked for a year with the Department of State in Washington, Berlin, and Whadden Hall (England), where he helped edit *Documents of German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945*. After receiving his Ph.D. in 1950, he served as instructor at New York University, assistant professor at University of Massachusetts-Amherst

and assistant professor at the University of Illinois, before accepting professorships at the University of Minnesota in 1961 and Indiana University, where he served as editor-in-chief of the *American Historical Review* from 1977 to 1985. The following year, he joined the faculty of Bard College in Annandale-on-Hudson as Stevenson Professor of History until his retirement in 1992.

Pflanze's first work, Bismarck and the Development of Germany: The Period of Unification 1815-1871 was published in 1963 and quickly assumed the status of a standard work. A winner of the Biennial Book Award of Phi Alpha Theta, the book launched thirty years of passionate and tireless work, culminating in the revision and expansion of this volume, which Princeton University Press republished in 1990 with the second and third volumes, Bismarck and the Development of Germany: The Period of Consolidation, 1871–1880 and Bismarck and the Development of Germany: The Period of Fortification, 1880–1898. Pflanze's magnum opus, recognized by many of his contemporaries as the most balanced and comprehensive work on Bismarck and his era, was collectively named Most Outstanding Book in History, Government, and Political Science by the Association of American Publishers in 1991. The translation, Bismarck. Der Reichsgründer, Bd. I (Beck Verlag, 1997) and Bismarck. Der Reichskanzler, Bd. II (1998) earned Pflanze the Einhard Prize for European Historical Biography by the Einhard Stiftung in Seligenstadt, Germany, in 1999. In a crowded field of competitors, Pflanze's work distinguished itself for its chronological and interpretive balance. Whereas previous (and subsequent) Bismarck biographers typically emphasized his early triumphs during German unification, Pflanze examined Bismarck's entire career. The three volumes struck an equipoise between the first years of nation building and the subsequent decades when Bismarck consolidated Germany's domestic and international governing frameworks and furthermore struggled to retain the political leadership of the Prussian aristocracy. In doing so, Pflanze laid aside the reigning paradigms of Bismarck as a good or evil "genius." In place of an indomitable iron chancellor, Pflanze rendered a portrait—at once critical and sympathetic—of a brilliant but vulnerable and flawed political mind, whose constitutional and institutional compromises did not stand the test of time.

Although hailed principally as the foremost biographer of Bismarck, Pflanze never fully accepted this designation, since the scope of his work exceeded the chronicling the life and accomplishments of Germany's preeminent statesman. Rather, Pflanze's achievement consisted of revealing the interaction between social, political, intellectual, and institutional forces of German history and Bismarck's idiosyncratic character. Pflanze often noted that Bismarck saw himself as caught in the "stream of time," which "man can neither create nor direct." Consequently, Pflanze strove to provide interlocking macro- and microinterpretive frameworks with which to understand the economic, political, and sociocultural currents that Bismarck navigated in his public and private life. It is the breadth and depth of Pflanze's synthetic analysis of Bismarck's life and times that make his opus an enduring contribution to modern German historiography. Writing in an era that witnessed the ascendancy of social scientific models and theory, Pflanze reasserted the historian's obligation to weigh contingency alongside structure, personal motives alongside public pressures, and cultural attitudes alongside economic forces when categorizing the manifold contexts that constitute a life and an individual's claims to agency. When reviewing Pflanze's volumes for the *Times Literary Supplement* in 1991, the Stanford historian James Sheehan noted that "He instinctively avoids single explanations: he believes in neither the autonomy of the international system nor the primacy of foreign policy; he accepts that economics are important but denies that political preferences flow directly from special interests; he knows that popular movements matter but does not doubt that statesmen can affect events. At heart, Pflanze is a pragmatist and an empiricist, who possesses in abundance the historian's characteristic virtues of skepticism, curiosity, and persistence." Sheehan concluded, "Thanks to Pflanze's extraordinary labors," we have "a biography worthy of its subject." In his review for the *American Historical Review* in 1992, David Blackbourn of Harvard University concurred: "comprehensive, confidently

Otto Pflanze was a member of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, N.J., a founding member of the Historisches Kolleg in Munich, and served on the board of editors for the *Journal of Modern History* and *Central European History*. He was also the recipient of fellowships from the Fulbright, Guggenheim, ACLS, and McKnight foundations. His other publications included *A History of the Western World: Modern Times* (co-authored with Stanley Payne, 3rd ed., 1975), *The Unification of Germany: Was there an Alternative?* (editor, 1968) and *Innenpolitische Probleme des Bismarck-Reiches* (co-editor, 1983). In addition he contributed critical essays on nineteenth-century Germany to numerous anthologies and such journals as *Historische Zeitschrift*, the *Journal of Modern History*, and the *American Historical Review*. His professional affiliations included the German Studies Association as well as a fifty-year membership to the American Historical Association.

constructed, and commandingly written, it is the splendid summation of a lifetime's

In addition to his scholarly achievements, Pflanze was an outstanding lecturer, seminar teacher, and director of doctoral research. Those dozens of scholars who studied with him as a graduate student or worked under him at the *American Historical Review* will remember not only his enormous learning, rigorous thinking, and brilliant editing but also the integrity of his judgment, the solidity of his advice, and the loyalty of his friendship. With the soft lilt of a faint Tennessee accent, an editor's flair for idiomatic cogency, and eyes that sparkled with intellect and wit, Pflanze's reputation as a teacher, advisor, editor, and general raconteur was celebrated. As Glenn Tinder, a colleague and friend, noted, "he was a large and heartening and intelligent presence in the world."

Pflanze is survived by his wife of 57 years, Hertha Maria Haberlander Pflanze; his three children, Charles, Stephen, and Katrine; a son-in-law, Graham Hatfull; two grandchildren; a sister; and nieces and nephews.

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